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Abstract 
The PhD thesis is divided in four parts: Part 1. The first part provides a historical and 
theoretical background of the most influential models of decision-making developed in the last 
few decades in the fields of economy and psychology. It begins with an overview of the basic 
principles of Neoclassical Economics and follows with a description of the studies that led to 
the birth and spread of Behavioral Economics. Part 2. The second part focuses on the main 
Behavioral Change policy programs developed in the last few years all over the world, 
particularly concentrating on the main features of the so called Nudge and on its alternative 
approach called Boost. Part 3. The center of attention of the third part are the researches carried 
out in the last few years in the Italian context by the author of this PhD thesis. The studies are 
divided in two main categories: the first includes experiments on the individual’s preferences 
within a laboratory setting while the second includes field experiments that study the actual 
choices of the individuals. Part 4. The last part offers a detailed description from a Behavioral 
Analytic point of view of some of the main concepts of Behavioral Economics and Nudge by 
highlight their common and divergent traits on a theoretical and practical level. This part is a an 
attempt to dig deeper into the topic of decisional processes and choices, by taking into account 
the extensive knowledge that derives from more than one century of studies on human behavior. 
Key words: Behavioral Economics; Behavioral Change; Nudge; Behavioral Analysis; 
Behavioral Science 
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Preface 
A student enters the canteen of his University and chooses a piece of cake instead 
of a fruit. An employee is offered to place part of his salary in a retirement plan 
and chooses not to take advantage of it. A customer in a restaurant has left some 
food in his plate that he cannot finish but he leaves without asking for the 
leftovers. Two teenagers sit on the table in a pub spending most of the night 
watching their smartphones instead of talking to each other. A woman is going to 
the gym to lose weight. She can choose to take the stairs or the elevator and she 
opts for the latter. 
All of the above examples have something in common. Although these situations 
look different they have something in common, they all involve people’s choice 
between alternative options or behaviors. Which factors influence the 
individual’s choices? How is it possible to help people take “wiser” decisions? 
In recent years Behavioral Sciences (BS) have increasingly focused on situations 
involving people’s choices and dysfunctional behaviors, aiming to find those 
variables that explain certain behavioral responses. Here the term 
“dysfunctional” is used just to describe behaviors that move people away from 
their personal goals or from the ones set by their social environment. Researchers 
from the fields of economy and psychology have shown that in certain 
circumstances people behave inconsistently with their long term goals or values 
(e.g. Kahneman and Tversky 1979, 1982; Tversky & Kahneman 1973, 1981). 
They found that the individuals’ behavioral responses are in fact greatly 
influenced by contextual factors.  
The principles that lie behind human behaviors (including their choices) and their 
relation to contextual factors has been studied in depth for many decades by the 
behavioral analysts (e.g. Skinner, 1938, 1953, 1957, 1971, 1974). However, it is 
just in the last few decades that the interest in this topic has grown exponentially 
in both fields of BS and of public policies. Starting with the formulation of the 
Prospect Theory by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1979), a milestone in 
XIII
Behavioral Economics and Behavioral Change Policies
the study of decisional processes, the debate on the individual's choice has 
received a huge interest from both fields of economy and psychology. That has 
led to the rise of new Behavioral Change (BC) policy programs that have spread 
all over the world in the last decades.  
XIV
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Introduction 
Choice concerns the way individuals allocate their time of responding among 
available response options (Fisher and Mazur 1997, p. 387). Humans live in a 
world characterised by limited resources where there is a constant need to deal 
with situations in which making choices is necessary. It could be a choice 
between different goods or different behaviors. Not choosing can also be 
considered a choice and often with relevant implications (for an extensive 
description see the book of Cass Sunstein “Choosing not to choose: 
Understanding the value of choice.”, 2015). Therefore, it is not surprising that 
the study of human choices is a fundamental issue in the fields of both economy 
and psychology.  
An important question rises when talking about choices: how do people take 
decisions and which are the factors that influence their choices? Different 
theories have been proposed over time with huge implications in the public 
domain. The rise of Behavioral Economics (BE), in particular, led in recent years 
to the development and spread of public policy programs consistent with its core 
principles all over the world. The most wide spread is defined as Nudge . 1
It is necessary to define few main concepts to have a more clear understanding of 
some of the most recent developments in the field of the study of decisions . The 2
most relevant is the definition of rationality. Individuals can be seen as more or 
less rational agents. Although the term rationality is commonly used with a 
positive connotation, it should be seen as purely descriptive. Rationality may be 
considered as widely arbitrary and it assumes a specific meaning only as part of a 
certain theoretical model.  
According to the Rational Choice Theory (RCT) behaviors can be divided in two 
categories: rational and irrational. The former are those that follow the axioms 
 The terms “Nudge” and “Nudging” will be used interchangeably in the PhD thesis1
 Although the terms decision and choice may have a different meaning, for the purpose of the 2
PhD thesis they will be used interchangeably
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postulated by the theory while the latter are those in contradiction to it. 
Comparing Neoclassical Economics (NE) and BE and referring to the above 
mentioned RCT, the first describes people as fundamentally rational, while the 
second claims that people often act in a way that is far from being considered 
rational (Angner 2017, p.4). 
Another important distinction is about the nature of the theories of choice that 
can be descriptive or normative. A descriptive theory explains how people act in 
reality in certain circumstances, on the other hand, a normative theory describes 
how people should be acting in a hypothetical best case. A theory can also be 
defined as both descriptive and normative. In this case the theory assumes that 
people act in the way that they should act (Angner 2017, p. 3). Typically, the 
term rational choice refers to those theories that are (or are meant to be) 
normatively correct, whether or not they are adequate from a descriptive point of 
view. NE claimed to be both normatively and descriptively adequate while BE 
aimed to be just descriptive (Kahneman, 2003). 
Part 1: an overview. This part of the thesis provides a historical and theoretical 
overview of the main models of decision making developed in the last decades. 
First, the main principles and theories of NE are described briefly. Next, BE is 
presented in depth with its main findings and its internal stream of studies. The 
attention is put on the work of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1937-1996) 
on one side and Gerd Gigerenzer on the other. This part is essential to introduce 
the second part of the PhD, in which are described the main policy programs 
unfolded from the principles of BE. 
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1. Neoclassical Economics: Historical Backdrop and Theoretical Framework 
The term “Neoclassical Economics” dates back to 1900, when the American 
economist Thorstein Veblen used it in his paper “The Preconceptions of 
Economic Science” (Veblen, 1900, cf. Colander, 2000). Two main periods can be 
traced within NE: an early stage and a postwar stage.  
Early Neoclassical Economics. In Classical Economics and the early stage of 
NE, it was widely accepted to talk about cognitive and affective states. The link 
between economic and psychological principles can be traced back to the work of 
the philosopher and economist Adam Smith (1723-1790). Although he did not 
have a theory of decision making in the modern sense, his vision of human nature 
appeared multifaceted and, like his contemporary David Hume, Smith was deeply 
interested in the psychological underpinnings of human behavior. 
Several contemporary authors (e.g. Palacios-Huerta 2003, p. 243; Ashraf, 
Camerer & Loewenstein 2005, p. 140) have gone so far as suggesting that Hume 
and Smith in fact identified and discussed some of the phenomena that now 
occupy BE. Smith and his contemporaries, analysed dynamically inconsistent 
behaviors and provided important insights about phenomena widely accepted and 
empirically tested in contemporary BE like loss aversion, overconfidence, social 
preferences and others.  
The early stage neoclassical economists were inspired by the utilitarian 
philosopher Jeremy Bentham and their economic models were based on hedonic 
psychology (Heukelom 2007, p. 2). The thought of the economist William Stanley 
Jevons well represents the spirit of the time who said that the subject of economy 
should have been maximising pleasure and reducing pain (Jevons, 1965, p. 37). 
Early neoclassical economists did not see any reason to adopt alternative methods 
to test the adequacy of the foundations of their economic theories because they 
were relying on the method of introspection to study people's choices and they 
believed that introspection supports the principles of hedonic psychology. This 
approach to the study of human behavior was one of the most common methods 
used in psychology as well until Behaviorism emerged in the scientific realm.  
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Postwar Neoclassical Economics. In 1913 John B. Watson wrote his pioneering 
article “Psychology as the Behaviorist Views it” (Watson, 1913) heavily 
criticizing reliance on introspection and the references to mental states. That 
article marked the emergence of Behaviorism (Gardner 1987, p. 11).  
In the postwar period, from the mid-1930’s to the mid-1950’s, NE also underwent 
analogous transformation (Mandler 2001, p. 8). Especially after the Second World 
War when the dissatisfaction of several economists towards the results achieved 
by NE brought change to the approach of the study of decision making. Postwar 
neoclassical economists wanted to root their discipline in a solid methodological 
ground and at the same time to improve the predictive power of their theories. 
They claimed that economy should make reference to conscious states so they 
rejected the idea that introspection was a scientifically acceptable means to 
explore such states. 
The basic concepts of pleasure and suffering as foundation of choice, were 
substituted by a theory of preferences. People's sensations of pleasure and 
suffering are not observable, while their choices can be observed directly. After 
assuming that people's choices reflect their preferences it was possible to test 
empirically what people prefer. By substituting the concept of “utility” (see Part 
1, section 1.2.2.) with the one of “preference”, postwar neoclassical economists 
explicitly intended to separate economy from psychology (Robbins 1984, p. 85). 
However, It is important to underline that they did not deny that people might be 
motivated by pleasure, pain and/or other mental states. They simply chose to 
remain agnostic about questions like motivation and preference formation arguing 
that such issues were outside the scope of economy (Robbins 1984, p. 86). 
To sum up, the most important characteristic of postwar NE is the sharp break up 
with the classical and the early neoclassical traditions. Postwar theorists directed 
their efforts toward cutting the bonds with all kinds of psychology (hedonic and 
etc.) in order to adapt economy better to contemporary methodological structures 
and to improve the predictive power of its theory. As a result, they developed a 
general theory that did not take into account some important specific features of 
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human behavior which will be described later on in the PhD thesis (Angner & 
Loewenstein, 2007). 
1.2. Rational Choice Theory 
NE was characterised by its association with the RCT, i.e. the most popular and 
influential economic model until 1970s (for an extensive description see the book 
“The Economic Approach to Human Behavior”, Becker 1976). One of the main 
assumptions of the RCT, is that individuals should act to maximise their gains and 
minimize their losses. The economic model claimed to be simultaneously 
descriptively adequate and normatively correct assuming that people would act 
mostly as they should. That does not mean that all individuals act rationally in 
every situation, but that deviations from perfect rationality are so small or not 
systematic that they can be neglected. Following that standpoint, people should 
not be affected by contextual factors, they would weight short and long term costs 
and benefits of each element of a choice set, sorting the available options 
according to their preferences. In order to be considered rational, people should 
act according to two fundamental axioms.  
1.2.1. Axioms in the Rational Choice Theory 
Transitivity. When three options are given, if the option A is preferred over the 
option B and the option B is preferred over the option C, then A should be also 
preferred over C (Angner 2017, p. 19). For example, choosing from the 
restaurant’s menu, in which there are available three different dishes, i.e. pizza, 
cheeseburger and salad, if the person prefers the pizza over the cheeseburger and 
the cheeseburger over the salad, therefore, according to the axiom, he would also 
prefer the pizza over the salad. Formally, this relation can be described in the 
following way: If A ≥ B ≥ C, then A ≥ C (for each A, B and C).  
Completeness. When a choice set is given people would always be able to say if 
they prefer the option A over the option B, or the opposite, or if neither is 
preferred (Angner 2017, p.20). Taking again as an example the menu of a 
restaurant, a person may say that he likes the pizza more than the cheeseburger, 
the cheeseburger more than the pizza, or that the two options are equally 
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preferred. Formally, the relation can be described in the following way: A ≥ B ∨ B 
≥ A (for each x, y). If B ≥ A e A ≥ B, it can be said that indifference prevails. 
According to the axiom, a rational man would choose his favorite option or in the 
case of indifference, one of his favorite.  
It is important to point out that the RCT does not explain why people prefer one 
option over another, i.e. why they prefer the pizza over the cheeseburger. It only 
describes the relation between the variables according to the two axioms.  
1.2.2. Utility 
One concept widely used in the RCT is utility. The concept of utility simply 
highlights the fact that when a choice set is provided, people should be able to put 
in order their preferences so that it would be possible to assign to each of the 
available options a number. The highest would represent the most favourite 
option, the lowest - the least favourite one. In the middle would be the other 
options, still arranged according to their preferences. For example, if a person 
likes pizza (A) more than cheeseburger (B) and cheeseburger more than a salad 
(C), than it would be possible to assign the number 3 to the pizza, 2 to the 
cheeseburger and 1 to the salad so that A>B>C. So an utility function u (·) 
represents a relation between the order of preference of the different options in a 
given choice set (Angner 2017, p. 32). 
The RCT describes how people should act in conditions of certainty in which risk 
is not involved. Those are situations in which a choice set with a limited number 
of options is given. The theory of rationality does not include choices in which 
risk is involved or probability has to be taken into account (Angner 2017, p.89). 
1.3. Theory of Probability  
The theory of probability takes into account these kind of situations in which 
people should make probabilistic reasoning and judgements. Supposing to have a 
set of outcomes called the sample space S. This sample space can be thought of as 
the universal set for all possible situations that we are studying. The sample space 
is comprised of subsets called events E1, E2, . . ., En. We also assume that there is 
a way of assigning a probability to any event E. The probability of the event E is 
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denoted as P(E) (Angner 2017, p.90). The theory of probability, as the RCT is 
based on some axioms. 
1.3.1. Axioms in the Theory of Probability 
The first two axioms described below are used in conditional probability, i.e. the 
measure of the probability of an event based on the occurrence of a previous 
event.  
Axiom one. The probability of any event is a non-negative real number. Formally, 
the axiom can be described in the following way: 0 ≤ Pr (E) ≤ 1. (Angner 2017, p.
91) 
Axiom two. If results are equally probable, so that {E13, E2..., En}, the probability 
of each event Ei is 1/n. Formally that can be described in the following way: 
Pr(Ei) = 1/n. (Angner 2017, p.91)  
The last four are used when dealing with unconditional probability, i.e. the 
measure of the probability that an event will end with a specific outcome, 
independent of the occurrence of any other event (Angner 2017, p.90).  
Axiom three. If two events E1 and E2 are mutually exclusive, then the probability 
of E1 or E2 is equal to the probability of E1 plus the probability of E2 , so that P(E1 
v E2 ) = P(E1) + P(E2). (Angner 2017, p.94) 
Axiom four. The probability of the entire sample space is one, so that P(S) = 1. 
(Angner 2017, p.95) 
Axiom five. The probability that an event E would not occur is equal to 1 minus 
the probability that the event occurs, so that: Pr(¬E) = 1 – Pr(E). (Angner 2017, p.
96) 
Axiom six. If two events E1 and E2 are independent, the probability of the 
intersection of E1 and E2 is equal to the probability of E1 multiplied by the 
the probability of E2, so that: Pr(E1 & E2) = Pr(E1) x Pr(E2) (Angner 2017, p.96). 
1.4. Expected Utility Theory 
The expected utility theory is another important feature in NE. It dates back to 
Daniel Bernoulli in the 18th century and was formally developed by John von 
Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in their book Theory of Games and Economic 
9
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Behavior (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). In their book, the authors 
defined the expected utility function in connection to lotteries and gambles. A 
lottery is a list of probabilities, where pi is the probability that outcome “i” 
occurs.  
The theory of expected utility combines the concept of “utility” from the RCT 
(see Part 1, section 1.2.2.) with the concept of “probability” (see Part 1, section 
1.3.) in order to build a model useful to define a rational decision maker in 
conditions of uncertainty and risk. The starting point for the von Neumann and 
Morgenstern was the utility function of Bernoulli (see Figure 1) from which they 
derived four axioms, i.e. completeness, transitivity, independence and continuity. 
Completeness and transitivity were already described as axioms in the RCT (see 
Part 1, section 1.2.1.), with the only difference that A, B and C has to be taken as 
lotteries (L, L’, L’’). 
1.4.1. Axioms of the Expected Utility Theory 
Independence. The independence axiom is the most controversial one. It assumes 
that if two lotteries L and L’ are mixed with a third one L’’ which is not relevant, 
the order of preference will be the same as if the two options were presented 
independently of the third one (Heukelom, 2007). Formally, this relation can be 
described in the following way: for any probability p∈[0,1] and any Lotteries L, 
L’ and L’’, L ≥ L’ if and only if pL + (1-p) L’’≥ pL’ + (1-p) L’’. 
Continuity. The continuity axiom assumes that when there are three lotteries (L, 
L’ and L’’) and the individual prefers L to L’ and L’ to L’’, then if there is a 
possible combination of L and L’’ the individual will be indifferent between this 
mix and the lottery L’ (Heukelom, 2007). Formally, this relation can be described 
in the following way: If L ≥ L’ ≥ L’’, then there exists a probability p∈ [0,1] such 
that L’∼ pL +(1-p) L’’. 
1.4.2. Expected Utility Function 
A rational agent, would choose according to the four axioms. His preference 
would be represented by an utility function, i.e. one can assign a real number 
(utility) ui to each outcome i = 1, 2, ..., n such that:  
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L ≥ L’ if and only if U(L) ≥ U(L’), where U([p1,p2,...,pn]) = p1u1 +p2u2 +...
+pnun. 
This result is called the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility theorem. (von 
Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). 
In the expected utility theory, risk preferences can be represented with an utility 
function (U) that is concave for risk-averse individuals, convex for risk takers 
individuals and linear for risk neutral individuals (see Figure 1). As it will be seen 
later on in the PhD thesis (Part 1, section 2.2.2.) some people often act in ways 
that are not consistent with the axioms of the theory, and that brought to the 
formulation of the Prospect Theory by Kahneman and Tversky. 
   
 
                 Figure 1. The graph represents the three possible shapes of  
   the utility function. 
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2. Behavioral Economics: Historical Backdrop and Theoretical Framework 
Although NE has achieved a leading position during the second half of the 
twentieth century, some economists started to think that their discipline would 
have benefit from a closer ties with psychology. According to Angner and 
Loewenstein (2007), the term “Behavioral Economics” can be found as early as 
1958 (cf. Boulding 1958, p. 21) and criticisms about the neoclassical perspective 
date back at least since the early 1950’s. Researchers like George Katona and 
Herbert Simon wrote books and made researches stressing on the need to use 
psychological measures in economy and about the need to adopt the notion of 
bounded rationality to better understand individuals’ decision making. However, 
the work of these authors did not change the direction of economy. (Camerer, 
Loewenstein & Rabin 2008, p. 6) 
Another important step in the emergence and spread of BE was the formulation 
of the expected utility and discounted utility models of decision making by the 
neoclassical economists. These models provided in fact “hard targets” that were 
easy to test empirically (Camerer, Loewenstein & Rabin 2008, p.6) and gave 
more solid base for the later development of BE.  
What was really influential for the birth of BE were two historical paradigm 
shifts. On one side the cognitive revolution that started from the 1960's onwards 
influenced psychology and the human sciences (Mandler, 2002). Cognitive 
scientists were skeptical about the idea of using a method based on introspection. 
However, they thought that scientific psychology should take into account what's 
“in the head of the people” (Angner and Loewenstein, 2007), including their 
attitudes, beliefs, desires and empirical rules. This paradigm shift had a great 
impact on both experimental and clinical psychology in the following decades 
with a long debate between the American and European schools of psychology, 
with a hegemony of the behavioral perspective since the beginning of the 
century. 
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Like cognitive scientists, on the other side, behavioral economists, despite being 
skeptical about the theories and methods of the early neoclassical period, 
renewed their interest in the psychological underpinnings of human behaviors 
and decisions. That led to paradigm shift in the field economy of the same 
magnitude as the one in psychology that positively influenced the BS.  
At this time, after the neoclassical period, economy and psychology reestablished 
their ties, both renewing their interest in the study of human behavior and in the 
way economic decisions are taken. All together those processes led to the birth of 
BE and to the development of policy programs deeply rooted and connected with 
the studies on human behavior (Prevedini & Carnevali, 2016). 
2.1. Defining Behavioral Economics 
Several authors attempted to define BE. Camerer and Loewenstein described it as 
an approach for understanding decision making and behavior that integrates BS 
with economic principles: 
“behavioral economics increases the explanatory power of economics by providing it 
with more realistic psychological foundations […] At the core of behavioral economics 
is the conviction that increasing the realism of the psychological underpinnings of 
economic analysis will improve the field of economics on its own terms - generating 
theoretical insights, making better predictions of field phenomena, and suggesting 
better policy”  
(Camerer, Loewenstein and Rabin 2004, p. 3). 
Richard Thaler, an American economist and Professor of Behavioral Science and 
Economics at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business gave a similar 
definition in the “Yearly Guide for Behavioral Economics”: 
“I view behavioral economics to be economics that is based on realistic assumptions 
and descriptions of human behavior. It is just economics with more explanatory power 
because the models are a better fit with the data.”  
(Thaler, 2016, p. 23) 
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Although different definitions have been provided, most of the experts in the 
field agree on a fundamental concept: the aim of BE is to provide a model of 
human behavior that is descriptively adequate. A theory that describes 
realistically how people choose, can be extremely powerful to help address 
dysfunctional behaviors and to help substitute them with functional ones. 
Therefore, it could be said that (more or less explicitly) the goal of BE is to study 
how people take decisions with the aim to help them to act consistently with their 
long term goals or with the goals of the society they belong to.  
As described above, according to NE humans would act as rational agents. That 
means that people are assumed to be completely aware of the costs and benefits 
associated with all possible actions and they would behave in ways that fully 
maximize their long-term gain. All behaviors are, in this sense, carefully 
calculated. Both behavioral and neoclassical economists consider economy as the 
study of people's decisions and the outcomes of these decisions for society. 
However, the former assume that humans, in certain conditions, act in ways that 
are inconsistent with the principles of rationality, i.e. they don’t act as they 
should.  
Daniel Kahneman, Psychologist and Nobel Prize winner in economy in 2002, 
brilliantly sums up these concepts in his book “Thinking, fast and slow” (2011).  
“Much of the discussion in this book is about biases of intuition. However, the focus on 
error does not denigrate human intelligence, any more than the attention to diseases in 
medical texts denies good health. Most of us are healthy most of the time, and most of 
our judgments and actions are appropriate most of the time. As we navigate our lives, 
we normally allow ourselves to be guided by impressions and feelings, and the 
confidence we have in our intuitive beliefs and preferences is usually justified. But not 
always. We are often confident even when we are wrong, and an objective observer is 
more likely to detect our errors than we are. ” 
 (Kahneman 2011, p.4 )  
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It is important to underline that behavioral economists don’t deny the existence 
of rationality per se and, therefore, BE shouldn’t be seen as an opposition to the 
NE. They just claim that, although in many situations people behave rationally, 
deviations from perfect rationality happen often and are systematic and that many 
irrational behaviors are easily predictable. Therefore, it is possible to develop 
theories to understand in what circumstances such behaviors take place and how 
to prevent them, which is the subject of study of BE.  
A central role in BE is represented by the concept of “bounded rationality” that is 
considered one of the psychological foundations and inseparable part of the 
definition of BE (Samson, 2014). The term was proposed by Herbert Simon to 
explain why people behave irrationally. According to the author, rationality is 
bounded because our cognitive system can rely on limited resources (Simon, 
1956, 1978). The notion of bounded rationality is the basis of two main research 
programs developed in the last decades. One was initiated by Kahneman and 
Tversky (e.g. Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Tversky and Kahneman,1974; 
Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1982) and was called Heuristic and Bias (H&B) 
and another one by Gerd Gigerenzer (e.g., Gigerenzer, G., Todd, P., & ABC 
Research Group ; Todd and Gigerenzer, 2012) called the Simple Heuristics (SH) 
(also known as “Fast and Frugal”).  
2.2. Kahneman and Tversky’s Framework of Research 
At the end of the 70’s Kahneman and Tversky, two Israeli psychologists, 
developed series of successful studies aimed at understanding how people make 
decisions. In particular, they focused on the study of decision-making under the 
condition of uncertainty, bringing to light some of the processes carried out by 
individuals that were in contrast with some of the above mentioned principles 
and theories of NE.  
The collaboration of Kahneman and Tversky comprised mainly three programs 
of research (Kahneman, 2003) , i.e. the H&B program (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1973; Tversky and Kahneman,1974; Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1982); the 
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Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman,1992) 
and the related notion of loss aversion (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990, 
1991; Tversky and Kahneman, 1991); and Framing effects (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1981, 1986).  
2.2.1. The Heuristics and Bias Program  
According to Kahneman (2003) the aim of the H&B research program was to set 
a map of “human bounded rationality” (Simon, 1956, 1978), describing the most 
prominent heuristics and systematic biases. The human cognitive system can rely 
on a limited amount of resources to solve problems. When the amount of 
information is too high or complex people are “forced” to rely on mental 
shortcuts and simplified strategies in order to make decisions, i.e. they are 
“forced” to use heuristics (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, Kahneman, 2011). 
Although these strategies work properly in most cases in certain circumstances 
they can lead to systematic mistakes in evaluation, called biases (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974  
In his book “Thinking Fast and Slow” (Kahneman, 2011) Kahneman adopted a 
dual system model to explain how people make decisions and to distinguish 
between intuition and reasoning. The author described two systems that 
metaphorically co-exist in people’s brain, borrowing from Keith Stanovich and 
Richard West (2000), two terms: System 1 and System 2. System 1 has been 
described as fast, automatic, effortless, associative and difficult to control. It had 
an important evolutionary function for the human species and it is still active 
nowadays when it is necessary to make complex choices. System 2, on the 
contrary, is slower, serial, effortful and deliberately controlled (see Figure 2). 
In most of the situations the two systems act in coordination. However, in certain 
cases the fast and automatic System 1 would get in conflict with the slower and 
based on reason System 2, leading to the above mentioned bias and, therefore, 
leading people to make predictable mistakes. 
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What follows is a description of the three most prominent heuristics and their 
related bias i.e. representativeness, availability, and anchoring as formulated by 
Kahneman and Tversky in their H&B stream of studies. 
 
     Figure 2. The scheme shows the dual system model of decision-making   
      (Kahneman, 2003). 
2.2.1.1. Anchoring 
A very common bias is the so called "anchoring effect" (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974). In order to make estimations on a quantitative dimension people often 
tend to anchor themselves to a reference point and to adjust it on the basis of 
further information recalled from their memory or received by external sources. 
This strategy is extremely useful and effective in many situations. For example, 
in order to estimate the time needed to get from our city to an unknown one, it 
can be useful to use as a reference point our distance to a city that we know. In 
this way it is possible to try to estimate the distance to our unknown destination. 
However, this strategy can lead to distortions and the adjustment process may be 
insufficient. People’s final judgments, indeed tend to be often biased towards the 
initial anchor. This bias was illustrated by Kahneman in his book “Thinking, fast 
and slow” (Kahneman 2011, p. 119) Students were asked to take a number from 
a tricked roulette so that a group of students took a low number (low anchor) and 
another one a high number (high anchor). Following the students were asked to 
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estimate the number of African countries participating in the United Nations. The 
experiment showed how the students’ answers were influenced by the numbers 
they got from the roulette, so that the students who took the lower number 
provided a lower estimation compared to the ones who took the higher number. 
The example did not just show the existence of this bias, but also that completely 
irrelevant numerical anchors can have a significant impact on people's decisions.  
2.2.1.2. Representativeness 
Another source of bias described by Kahneman and Tversky is the so called 
"representativeness heuristics" (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). Very often, 
assessing the likelihood that an element A belongs to a category B, people make 
their choices based on the similarity between A and their idealistic image of B, in 
other words, on how much A is representative of B. This strategy sometimes is 
successful and yet very often leads to mistakes and decisions based on 
stereotypes instead of probabilistic assumptions.  
Representativeness has been brilliantly showed in the “Linda” experiment 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Tversky and Kahneman, 1983) in which the 
researchers provided the experimental subjects with the description of a fictitious 
character called Linda. The description was the following:    
“Linda is thirty-one years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in 
philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and 
social justice, and also participated in antinuclear demonstrations.”  
Following, the experimental subjects were asked to estimate the likelihood that 
Linda would belong to the two categories listed below: 
1) Lisa is a bank teller  
2) Lisa is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement. 
About 85% to 90% of the experimental subjects opted for the second option 
violating the conjunction rule, which says that the conjunction of two events 
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cannot be more probable than any of the two events alone (bank teller): P(A & B) 
≤ P(B) (Kahneman, 2011). 
The mistake, was reasonable due to the fact that the description of Linda was 
more representative of the conjunction of the the 2 options (option 2) than of just 
one of them (option 1). This phenomenon is commonly known as the conjunction 
fallacy (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983).  
2.2.1.3. Availability 
Another shortcut that is often misleading is the “heuristics of 
availability” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). Individuals tend to assess the 
probability of an event frequency based on the ease with which they recall 
examples relevant to it. Thus, often overestimating the possibility of that event to 
happen and underestimating another actually more frequent one.  
For example, in one of their studies Kahneman and Tversky found that the 
frequency of words that started with “k in the English dictionary was erroneously 
judged to be higher than the frequency of words with a ‘k’ as the third letter. 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). The authors claimed that this happened because 
retrieving words by their first letter is easier than by their third one. 
This process is closely related to concepts of accessibility and salience (Thaler & 
Sunstein, 2009, p. 25). For example, people often tend to overestimate the 
incidence of events causing vivid and emotional deaths, such as hurricanes or 
earthquakes, while underestimating the likelihood of occurrence of less vivid but 
statistically significant events such as deaths caused by asthma attacks. Similarly, 
most recent events tend to have a greater impact on people's behavior and 
choices than older events (e.g. Burns, Peters & Slovic, 2011; Slovic, 1987; ; see 
also Thaler & Sunstein, 2009).  
2.2.2. Prospect Theory      
The Prospect theory, is a behavioral model that shows how people take decisions 
in circumstances that involve risk and uncertainty, i.e. in which there is a certain 
probability to gain or lose something. Prospect theory was claimed to be 
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explicitly a descriptive theory of choice. That represented a novelty at the time, 
in contrast to a long history of models of rational choice that served double duty 
as normative logics and as idealised descriptive models. Kahneman and 
Tversky’s formulation (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) assumed that people would 
think in terms of expected utility in relation to a reference point rather than in 
terms of absolute outcomes.  
Setting up several choice risk experiments involving problems presented in 
different frames, the authors developed the “value function” and the “concept of 
loss aversion”. Usually people dislike losses more than an equivalent gain and for 
this reason they are more willing to take risks to avoid a loss than to gain 
something. Moreover, people's willingness to take risks is influenced by the way 
in which choices are framed. (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Kahneman, 2003; 
Kahneman, 2011). 
According to NE, the utility of decision outcomes is assumed to be determined 
entirely by the final state of endowment and therefore, it is reference-
independent. In 1738 Daniel Bernoulli described this concept in his essay, 
proposing the so called “theory of expected utility” (Stearns, 2000). Bernoulli’s 
assumption was that states of wealth have a specified utility and while taking 
choices under risk, people maximise the expected utility of wealth.  
The assumption that decision makers evaluate outcomes by the utility of final 
asset positions has been retained in economic analyses for almost 300 years. 
Kahneman and Tversky developed different experiments to empirically test the 
assumption, showing repeatedly the inadequacy of the utility function in 
explaining choice. The authors, calling it Bernoulli's error, described it as a clear 
example of theory-induced blindness. That means that once a theory has been 
accepted and repeatedly used as a reliable model noticing its flaws gets 
extremely difficult (Kahneman, 2003). Let’s take a look at the following 
problems:  
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Problem 1: In addition to whatever you own, you have been given $1,000. 
You are now asked to choose one of these options: 
A) 50% chance to win $1,000 or  
B) get $500 for sure     
Problem 2: In addition to whatever you own, you have been given $2,000. 
You are now asked to choose one of these options: 
   C) 50% chance to lose $1,000 or 
   D) lose $500 for sure      
Although the problems are equivalent in terms of final states of wealth, they are 
framed in a different way. As a result, while in the first one a greater proportion 
of people would chose the riskless option B), in the second one people would be 
more likely to choose the riskier one C). In other words, people’s responses to the 
problem are different if it is framed as a gain (1) or as a loss (2) (Kahneman 
2011, p. 280). 
In Bernoulli's theory a reference point was not taken into account. In their 
formulation Kahneman and Tversky proposed an alternative theory of risk, in 
which the carriers of utility are gaining and losing changes of wealth rather than 
states of wealth (Kahneman, 2003).  
Prospect Theory predictions have been represented by Kahneman and Tversky in 
the value function (see Figure 3) that is defined by gains and losses and is 
characterised by three features:  
1) it is concave in the domain of gains, favoring risk aversion;  
2) it is convex in the domain of losses, favoring risk seeking;  
3) it is sharply kinked at the reference point, and loss-averse-steeper for 
losses than for gains by a factor of about 2-2.5 (Kahneman, Knetsch, & 
Thaler, 1991; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Kahneman, 2003; 
Kahneman, 2011).  
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The Prospect Theory and its publication on the prestigious economic journal 
Econometrica of the seminal paper “Prospect theory: An analysis of decisions 
under risk” (1979) has been a milestone in the development of BE. It is thanks to 
and starting with this paper (that is currently the most cited in the history of the 
journal) that the discipline began to spread widely all over the world with a huge 
impact on the field of study of decision making and with a positive influence on 
policy makers.  
 
           Figure 3. The graph (Kahneman, 2002) shows the value function  
           described by Kahneman and Tversky in the Prospect Theory.  
2.2.3. Framing Effect 
The last stream of studies of Kahneman and Tversky focused on the so called 
“framing effect” (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981, 1986). According to the 
principle of invariance, an essential aspect of rationality, preferences should not 
be affected by variations of irrelevant options or outcomes (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1986). Kahneman and Tversky showed how the principle is 
systematically violated in certain circumstances and how people’s decisions are 
affected by the frame in which a problem is formulated. It was tested empirically, 
using “ad-hoc problems”, like the one of the Asian disease (Tversky & 
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Kahneman, 1981). People were randomly assigned two versions of the same 
problem that was the following: 
“Imagine that the United States is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian 
disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the 
disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the 
consequences of the programs are as follows”    
In the first version of the problem, the possible options were the following: 
1) If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved    
2) If Program B is adopted, there is a ⅓ probability that 600 people will be saved 
and a ⅔ probability that no people will be saved  
     Which of the two programs would you favor?     
In this version of the problem, most of the respondents preferred the program A. 
The same story was proposed to other people, framing the possible options in a 
different way: 
1) If Program A’ is adopted, 400 people will die    
2) If Program B’ is adopted, there is a one-third probability that nobody will die 
and a two-thirds probability that 600 people will die  
     Which of the two programs would you favor?    
In this version of the story, conversely to the first one, the majority of people’s 
preference was for the program B’, the risk-seeking option. In other words, 
people preferred the option A over the option B and the option B’ over the option 
A’. From the perspective of a rational model of decision-making, this clearly 
does not make sense, considering that there is no substantial difference between 
the two versions. (Kahneman & Tversky, 1981, Kahneman, 2003). The authors 
interpret this outcome claiming that for the respondents of the first version of the 
problem, the certainty of saving people was disproportionately more attractive. 
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Conversely, the certainty of deaths in the second version was disproportionately 
more aversive.  
In another famous experiment, McNeill, Pauker, Sox and Tversky (1982), 
showed that people’s choice between surgery and radiation therapy was changing 
by describing outcome statistics in terms of survival rates or mortality rates. 
When the rate was proposed in a frame of survival, i.e. 90% short-term survival, 
the chance that patients choose the surgery option was substantially higher than 
when a mortality frame was used, i.e 10% immediate mortality.  
2.3. Gigerenzer’s Framework of Research 
The conceptual framework of Kahneman and Tversky has been certainly the 
most prominent in the field of BE. As extensively described, the H&B program 
interprets bounded rationality in terms of a wide range of systematic biases 
treated by Kahneman and Tversky as deviations from normative behaviors. 
Implicitly the H&B program, accepted thus the neoclassical model of rationality 
as the normative standard of rational behavior. However, some authors criticised 
some of the assumptions of Kahneman and Tversky providing alternative 
explanations in the domain of decision-making. Among these, the Simple 
Heuristics research program (SH) (e.g., Gigerenzer, Todd & ABC Research 
Group, 1999; Gigerenzer, Hertwig & Pachur, 2011) proposed by the German 
psychologist Gerd Gigerenzer that will be here briefly described in its core 
concepts.  
The author developed his stream of studies inspired by Herbert Simon’s emphasis 
on environmental structures and the interplay between cognition and 
environment. (e.g. Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 2002; see also Gigerenzer, 2015). 
Simon, indeed provided an ecological view of human behavior in order to 
explain people decisions: “the human rational behavior is shaped by a scissors 
whose two blades are the structure of task environments and the computational 
capabilities of the actor.”(Simon, 1990, p. 7). According to Simon’s standpoint, 
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internal factors are not sufficient to explain behaviors because they don’t take 
into account the influence of the context in which they take place. 
Comparing the H&B and the SH programs it can be said that they share a 
common objective, that is to build on Simon’s notion of bounded rationality 
(Grüne-Yanoff & Hertwig, 2015). However, the two programs diverge in several 
points. According to Gigerenzer there are three main differences between the SH 
and the H&B programs (Gigerenzer, Hertwig & Pachur 2011, p.8): 
First, in the H&B program heuristics have been used as common-sense labels 
typically not been developed into computational models (Gilovich, Griffin & 
Kahneman, 2002), The SH program on the contrary, proposed a computational 
model of heuristics. 
Second, the H&B provided a definition of rationality that was not based on 
Simon's scissors metaphor. The structure of the environment in shaping people's 
behavior has not been taken into account in the H&B. The SH, on the contrary, 
provided an ecological perspective of rationality, by taking into account the 
structure of the specific environment in shaping people's decisions (Todd, 
Gigerenzer & the ABC Research Group, 2012). Humans are seen as ecologically 
rational. That means that their way to make decisions evolved according to the 
constraints of the environment and the whole of the organism. 
Third, the H&B program rests on the assumption of a general accuracy–effort 
trade-off. That means that people cannot put less effort in a task and increase its 
accuracy. The SH, instead provides evidence of some violations of the 
information-accuracy tradeoff (e.g. Gigerenzer, Todd & ABC Research Group, 
1999) as will be described in the next sections. 
2.3.1. Simple Heuristics Program 
According to Gigerenzer, the aim of SH is to explore the cognitive mechanisms 
that a boundedly rational decision maker, with limited computational capacity, 
employs in order to take decisions that are “good enough” (e.g. Goldstein & 
Gigerenzer, 2002). More precisely, Gigerenzer described three main goals of the 
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SH developed in different streams of studies, i.e. to explore and describe the 
“adaptive toolbox” that provides knowledge about people’s decisions; to provide 
an extensive description of the notion of “ecological rationality”; and design 
intuitive strategies that help people make better decisions (Gigerenzer, Hertwig 
& Pachur 2011, pp.6-7). 
A description of the first two goals follows and the last one is discussed in Part 2 
of the PhD thesis when talking about what has been proposed by some authors as 
“boosting” (see Part 2, section 4). 
2.3.1.1. The Adaptive Toolbox 
This program is descriptive in its nature and aims to describe how actual humans 
make decisions, considering their bounded rationality, and to map the heuristics 
on which individuals rely in order to develop a box of cognitive tools. Following 
the view of Evolution, the ultimate goal of all species is reproduction. The 
adaptive toolbox helps them to face different situations and to pursue their goals 
by making decisions that are as quick and accurate as possible. Its function is not 
to guarantee consistency in decisions but to provide tools that are useful to 
achieve proximal goals, such as finding a mate or escaping dangers. 
The heuristics described in the toolbox are domain specific and are made up of 
building blocks that are more general and can be part of different heuristics. 
These building blocks are defined as Search Rules, Stopping Rules and Decision 
Rules (Gigerenzer & Selten 2002, p. 43). 
Search Rules. Search rules building blocks include random search, ordered 
search and search by imitation and refer to two fundamental exploration 
dimensions: search for alternatives within a choice set and search for cues by 
evaluating the available alternatives (Gigerenzer & Selten 2002, p. 43-44). 
Stopping Rules. At some point it is necessary to stop and search for alternatives 
or cues in order to decide what to do next. However, stopping rules don’t work 
weighing all the costs and benefits of certain decisions but rather they follow 
simple criteria that are easy to confirm (Gigerenzer & Selten 2002, p. 44-45). 
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Decision Rules. Once the search has been stopped a decision or inference must 
be made. Traditionally theories of decision-making stress on the notion of a 
general accuracy-effort trade-off. When people deal with situations in which they 
need to take a decision, more accuracy can be gained just by putting more effort. 
However, not always there is a trade-off between simplicity and accuracy and in 
some circumstances, less information and less computations could lead to more 
accurate predictions (Gigerenzer & Selten 2002, p. 45). 
2.3.1.2. Ecological Rationality 
The stream of studies on ecological rationality is normative in its nature and it is 
focused on the analysis of the structure of the environment and the conditions 
under which heuristics are likely to succeed or fail (Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 
2002). According to Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) when the heuristics match 
with specific contexts can be an effective tool for the individuals and the degree 
of this matching determines the accuracy of the heuristics. An advantage in the 
use of simple heuristics, compared with more complex model of reasoning is 
their robustness and generalisability to other contexts and to new problems. 
Moreover, simple heuristics work particularly well in environments characterised 
by uncertainty and unpredictability (Gigerenzer, Todd & ABC Research Group, 
1999, pp.18-20). In other words, the parameter to define a strategy as 
ecologically rational is the degree on which it is adapted to the information in a 
physical or social environment. Two of the most known (and adaptive) heuristics 
described in the SH are recognition heuristic and gaze heuristic. 
2.3.1.2.1. Recognition Heuristic  
Among the heuristics proposed in the the SH program, Goldstein and Gigerenzer 
(2002) described what they called recognition heuristic: 
“The recognition heuristic exploits the basic psychological capacity for recognition in 
order to make inferences about unknown quantities in the world”  
(Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002). 
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Goldstein and Gigerenzer showed how this kind of mental shortcut can lead to 
positive outcomes. The authors, tested this assumption by asking to US and 
German students to estimate the population of both American and German cities. 
The students were provided with the names of a pair of cities and asked to choose 
which one has more citizens. Interestingly, it was found that US students were 
scoring better than German ones asked to estimate German cities. In a similar 
way, German students scored better than US ones when they had to make 
estimates of the American cities. This kind of results are present also in other 
kind of heuristics and have been defined as “less is more effect”. It shows how in 
certain circumstances people violate the “accuracy-effort trade-off” performing 
better when they have less information (Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 2002; see also 
Samson, 2016). 
2.3.1.2.2. Gaze Heuristic  
Another heuristic described by Gigerenzer, is the so called “Gaze Heuristic”. The 
heuristic describes how in some circumstances just by eye gaze, it is possible to 
predict the outcome and take fast and effective decisions. This concept has been 
clarified by the author in his book “Risk Savvy” (2015) by describing as an 
example a real event that in 2016 inspired the movie “Sully”:   
On January 2009, three minutes after the take off from La Guardia airport in New 
York City, a flock of geese flew into both engines of a US Airways Flight 1549 
with 150 passengers on board, shutting the engine down. After running all the 
emergency procedures related to the engine issue, the captain Chesley 
Sullenberger and the copilot Jeffrey Skiles had to take an immediate and crucial 
decision to try going back to La Guardia airport or to try landing in the Hudson 
River. Processing all the relevant information in that moment such as speed, wind 
and altitude would have probably meant to crash. Instead, Sullenberger and 
Skiles simply used a rule of thumb: Fix your gaze on the tower. If the tower rises 
in your windshield, you won’t make it.    
In 2009, During the popular talk show of Charlie Rose, Skiles stated:  
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“It’s not so much a mathematical calculation as a visual one, in that when you are 
flying in an airplane, things that…….a point that you cannot reach will actually rise in 
your windshield. A point that you are going to overfly will descend in your windshield.” 
This rule of thumb brought Sullenberger to take the decision to land on the river. 
All the passengers plus the captain and the copilot survived the accident. In this 
case what made the “Hudson Miracle” possible was the combination of 
teamwork, the use of checklist, and the above mentioned rule of thumb 
(Gigerenzer 2015, pp. 24-25). 
2.4. Simple Heuristics and Heuristics and Bias programs: Practical 
Implications  
Gigerenzer’s heavy criticisms of the H&B work led to a sharp debate with 
Kahneman and Tversky (e.g. Gigerenzer 1991, 1996; Kahneman & Tversky, 
1996). While the first repeatedly claimed the inconsistency of some assumptions 
of Kahneman and Tversky’s work (Gigerenzer, 1991, 1996), the second rejected 
Gigerenzer’s criticisms by arguing their mismatch with the assumptions of their 
work (Kahneman & Tversky, 1996).  
As stated by Kahneman: 
“Gigerenzer's critique employs a highly unusual strategy. First, it attributes to us 
assumptions that we never made (e.g., that judgmental heuristics are independent of 
content and context or that judgments of probability and of frequency yield identical 
results). Then it attempts to refute our alleged position by data that either replicate our 
prior work (extensional cues reducing conjunction errors) or confirm our theoretical 
expectations (discrepancy between individual and global measures of overconfidence). 
These findings are presented as devastating arguments against a position that, of course, 
we did not hold. Evidence that contradicts Gigerenzer's conclusion (base-rate neglect 
with explicit random sampling; conjunction errors in frequency judgments) is not 
acknowledged and discussed, as is customary; it is simply ignored. Although some 
polemic license is expected, there is a striking mismatch between the rhetoric and the 
record in this case.”  
(Kahneman, 1996). 
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An in depth analysis of the debate between the authors is beyond the purpose of 
this PhD thesis. However, the work of Kahneman and Tversky (mainstream BE) 
on one side, and that of Gigerenzer on the other, not necessarily have to be seen 
as in opposition. Actually their explanations could be complementary, both 
adding to the better comprehension of the reasons why different decision making 
processes occur in different situations. 
In the second part of the PhD thesis are illustrated the practical implications of 
both the H&B and SH programs by describing two of the most flourishing policy 
programs that emerged in the last decades, i.e. Nudge and Boosting.  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Introduction 
As described in the first part of the PhD thesis, in some occasions people act in 
contradiction with the principles of rationality. For example sometimes people 
choose an option A over an option B even though the second option would be 
more beneficial for them. The task of policymakers is to help people take 
decisions and make choices that are in line with their goals and wellbeing.  
In the last 20 years BS deeply influenced the design and implementation of 
public policies (see Jones, Pykett & Whitehead, 2013; Lunn 2014; Shafir 2013). 
Disciplines such as psychology, BE, sociology and various branches of the 
neurosciences, provided policymakers with useful tools to understand better 
human behaviour beyond the concept of rationality. Within this context, in the 
last decades, the notion of “Behavioral Change” (BC) (a term used to describe 
strategies to influence people's behaviors) has been increasingly used in the 
realm of public policies. The study of human decision-making and the impact of 
social contexts, emotions and other relevant factors on it, became crucial in 
developing public policies. Several governments created centrally directed units 
with the goal to set contexts that promote virtuous and prosocial behaviors 
(Whitehead et al., 2014). 
Spreading of Behavioral Change Policies. In their report, Whitehead and 
colleagues (2014) published data about the overall spread of BC policies in the 
world. Figure 4 shows 135 countries where BC policies have been developed at 
least in some parts of their territories. Among these, 51 developed nudge-type 
centrally directed policies (see Figure 5). Moreover, in many countries were 
centrally directed policies are absent, nudge-type policies are still adopted though 
used in a “more ad hoc” way (see Figure 6). 
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Figure 4. On the world map are shown in red the 135 countries in which BC policies have been 
implemented  
 
Figure 5. On the world map are shown in green the 51 countries in which have been developed 
nudge-type centrally directed policies. 
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Figure 6. On the world map are shown in green the countries in which have been developed 
nudge-type centrally directed policies. In red are shown the countries in which nudge-type 
policies are adopted, even though  not centrally directed.  
Behavioral Change Tools. According to Ly, Mazar, Zhao and Soman (2013) 
there are various tools available for policy makers in order to promote desirable 
BCs: 
Regulation and Restrictions. It is possible to ban certain options, especially when 
certain behaviors are harmful and expose people to high risks. However, a 
backfire of this banning strategy is often the lack of compliance and it may lead 
to resistance among the population and to side behaviors that are not easy to 
control. 
Incentives. Another tool to promote BC is the use of incentives that can be 
negative or positive (that can be monetary and non monetary). The first include 
those tools that are assumed to discourage certain behaviors, such as fines or 
taxes. The second include for example grants and subsidies, but also symbolic 
rewards and aim to increase the probability of certain behaviors.  
Information and Education. Rising awareness among people and educating them 
is assumed to be useful to help people act in rational ways or to help them make 
informed decisions. However, educating people and providing them with 
information about risks and benefits of certain behaviors in many occasion may 
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not be sufficient. During the years, traditionally, governments have developed 
huge campaigns to promote desirable behaviors, like doing physical activity, or 
to reduce behaviours that are harmful, like smoking. However, often those 
produced little or no results. That does not mean that education or information 
should not be provided or used as a tool. However often people act automatically 
and are influenced by contextual factors that cannot be overcome by using just 
information. These strategies should be seen as complementary to other tools. 
Nudges and “Nudge-type” Strategies. Instead of restricting people's behaviors, 
providing them with a lot of information or changing their economic incentives, 
nudges aim to influence people's behavior by working on physical or verbal 
stimuli in the environment in which they move and live. This is a relatively 
recent strategy in BC that have spread greatly in the last few years. 
Part 2: an overview. In this part of the PhD thesis is traced first the main 
historical and theoretical frame of Nudge. Next is provided, an overview of the 
main and emerging alternative approach to Nudge defined by some authors as 
Boosting (e.g. Grüne-Yanoff & Hertwig, 2015; Hertwig & Ryall, 2016). It was 
based on the theoretical framework of the SH program (see Part 1, section 
2.4.1.), (Gigerenzer, Todd & ABC Research Group 1999; Gigerenzer & Selten, 
2002; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002; Gigerenzer, 2015). This part, together with 
the principles described in Part 1 is necessary to introduce the third part of the 
thesis, in which are described the research projects carried out by the author of 
the thesis.  
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3. Nudge: Historical Backdrop and Theoretical Framework 
BE started as an academic attempt to assess and describe irrational choices. 
Authors like Kahneman and Tversky aimed to challenge some of the notions 
postulated by the NE. From the notion of bounded rationality different research 
programs were developed (see Part 1, section 2.2.) . The most well known was 
defined as H&B program (Kahneman, 2003) and its aim was to set a map of 
human decision making taking into account the main systematically committed 
mistakes in the process of making choices.  
In recent years BE moved from the academic realm to the one of public policy. 
The stream of work promoted by an American economist Richard Thaler and an 
American legal scholar, Cass Sunstein was particularly flourishing. Since the 
publication of their book “Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, 
and Happiness” (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008), Nudge gained critical and 
widespread visibility.  
Searching on the Pubmed database the number of publications that include in 
their titles or abstracts the terms “nudge” or “nudging” are 388 since the 
formulation of the Prospect theory by Kahneman and Tversky (see Figure 7). 
Among them 330 (85%) have been published since 2008, i.e. the year of the 
publication of Thaler and Sunstein’s book (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Moreover, 
by taking into account just the number of papers published since Thaler and 
Sunstein’s seminal work, it is possible to observe an exponential increase. 
Between 2008 and 2012, 81 papers were published, while 249 has been 
published between 2013 and 2017 . 3
The spread of Thaler and Sunstein’s work gathered so much interest in the public 
domain that the President Barack Obama decided to appoint Sunstein as 
administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (Grunwald, 
2009). In this way the theoretical framework of BE became crucial to the 
 Data are updated on 3 September 20173
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understanding of how to set environments that promote sustainable and positive 
BCs.  
 
         Figure 7. The figure represents the cumulative number of 
         publications found on the database of Pubmed using as  
         keywords “nudge” or “nudging”.  
To date, interest in Nudge has been supported by a large number of interventions 
all over the world that shows their effectiveness in a broad range of domains 
from social policies to environmental protection (e.g. Thaler & Benartzi, 2004; 
Reinhart, Marshall, Feeley, & Tutzauer, 2007; Ayer, Raseman & Shih, 2009; 
Duflo, Esther, Kremer & Robinson, 2011; Behavioral Insights Team, 2010, 2011; 
Gallagher & Updegraff, 2012) showing the multifaceted nature of Nudge. 
Econs and Humans. Nudge can be conceptualised as an approach that is 
applicable to the domain of public policies and is deeply rooted in the theoretical 
frame of BE and more precisely in Kahneman and Tversky’s theorisation. To 
introduce the concept of Nudge, it is useful to start with the distinction made by 
Thaler and Sunstein (2008) between Econs (or homo oeconomicus), hypothetical 
beings able to behave always rationally, and Humans (or homo sapiens), i.e. the 
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people that really populate our planet and are more influenced by contextual 
factors:   4
“If you look at economics textbooks, you will learn that homo economicus can think like 
Albert Einstein, store as much memory as IBM’s Big Blue, and exercise the willpower of 
Mahatma Gandhi. Really. But the folks that we know are not like that. Real people have 
trouble with long division if they don’t have a calculator, sometimes forget their spouse’s 
birthday, and have a hangover on New Year’s Day. They are not homo economicus; they 
are homo sapiens.”  
(Thaler & Sunstein, pp. 6-7)  
Let’s take as an example one of the most important issues of public health in 
modern society i.e. unhealthy eating habits and obesity. According to the World 
Health Organization the incidence of obesity globally has doubled since 1980. In 
2008, 35% of the world's adult population was overweight (BMI ≥ 25 kg / m2) 
11% of which were obese (BMI ≥ 30 kg / m2), (World Health Organization, 
2014). Although it is perfectly clear and scientifically proven that obesity 
increases the risk of serious illness and premature death (World Health 
Organization Regional Office for Europe, 2014) many people engage in eating 
habits that are harmful to their health. For example many people eat regularly 
fast food thinking about the immediate pleasure, allured by the little effort in 
terms of time and cost. That gives the impression that people are mindless or 
underestimate the consequences of their own behavior (Thaler & Sunstein, 
2008). Several other examples can be listed: smoking, taking drugs, doing little 
or no physical activity, wasting food, etc. 
In all the listed situations, Econs would act in a completely different way. 
Knowing the effects of overeating, smoking or taking drugs they would compare 
the benefits of behaviors that provide immediate pleasure, with the probability to 
develop severe diseases or to die prematurely. Consequently, they would choose 
 This distinction is not new, it is present since the emerging of Behavioral Economics.  4
Many other terms and concepts adopted by Thaler and Sunstein (e.g. System 1 and System 2) 
are borrowed from the work of Kahneman and Tversky.
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to follow a healthy diet and to spend their life without smoking or taking drugs. 
In other words, they would act according to the principles of rationality (see Part 
1, section 1.2.).  
According to the theorisation of Kahneman and Tversky (e.g. Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979; Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman, 2011) Humans use simplified 
strategies for reasoning called heuristics, that lead them to make systematic 
mistakes called bias (see Part 1, section 2.2.1.). The term “systematic” here plays 
a crucial role, as Dan Ariely described in one of his books people are predictably 
irrational (Ariely, 2009). That means that it is possible to observe in what 
conditions certain biased choices are recurrent and then to develop strategies that 
promote positive BCs. 
3.1. Defining Nudge 
As stated by Thaler and Sunstein a nudge is “any aspect of the choice 
architecture that alters people's behavior in a predictable way without forbidding 
any options or significantly changing their economic incentives” (Thaler & 
Sunstein, 2008 p. 6). Looking at the author's’ definition a few core concepts 
could be determined and clarified: 
First, a nudge is an intervention that acts upon the context in which people live 
(any aspect of the choice architecture); second, the main goal of a nudge is to 
influence people's behaviors (altering people’s behavior); third, biased choices 
are systematic, and provide the opportunity to set interventions that have 
predictable outcomes (in a predictable way); and finally, a Nudge intervention 
does not use coercion, punishments or significant economic incentives  (without 5
forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives). 
Each of these points is detailed in the following sections. 
 Talking about economic incentive may be unclear and misleadingly focusing the attention just 5
on monetary incentives. However, Thaler and Sunstein clarify this notion by warning the 
readers to consider as incentives also cognitive (rather than material) costs necessary to make a 
choice. In this perspective, both material and cognitive costs should be kept low (Thaler and 
Sunstein 2008, p. 8) 
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3.1.1. Choice Architecture 
In their book, Thaler and Sunstein coined the term “choice architecture” to 
underline the deep influence that environment can have on people’s choices. The 
authors underline this concept with a brilliant metaphor. As well as an architect in 
planning a building can facilitate certain behaviors, policy makers can work on 
the environment in which people move in order to promote behaviors that are in 
line with the goal of the citizens and their collectivity (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008, 
p. 3). This goal can be achieved acting upon physical or verbal stimuli, changing 
for example the way in which options are presented to people or verbally 
prompting to them certain choices.  
To further clarify the concept, let’s take the example of an initiative called 
“choose my plate". In order to educate people to follow a balanced diet, US 
government used for long time the traditional figure of a food pyramid in which 
the different amounts of the needed nutrients were illustrated within a pyramid in 
descending order. This image is certainly scientifically correct, but very little 
intuitive. 
Under Obama’s administration the pyramid was replaced by a new image, a plate 
on which there were represented the daily proportions of the different nutrients: 
fruits, vegetables, cereals and proteins are clearly indicated (see Figure 8).  
The information became clearer, simpler to use and easier to retrieve by the 
memory when choosing or consuming food without using coercion (Moderato, 
2014). 
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Figure 8. In the figure above are shown “MyPlate” and the “Food Pyramid” respectively from 
left to right.  
Choice architecture would be most effective as a team work between researchers 
and policy makers. The former should test the effectiveness of the different tools 
and behavioral procedures to change people's irrational behaviors. The latter 
should work to spread the knowledge, applying evidence based interventions on 
a large scale.  
3.1.2. Choice Architecture: a Tool Kit 
During the years, researchers tested several effective strategies (nudges) useful to 
promote positive BCs, by observing people's interactions with their environment 
and the circumstances in which an intervention may be useful. These strategies 
may be more or less generalisable among contexts and require specific 
competences in order to be adequate to change the targeted behaviors. Thaler, 
Sunstein and the stream of researchers who supported their approach tried to 
describe some of the most effective strategies to influence people's behaviors. 
Two fundamental ways to address biases are defined as de-biasing and counter-
biasing (e.g. Brest, 2013; Milkman, Rogers & Bazerman, 2009). The former aims 
to develop strategies to activate System 2 (rationality and analytical processing). 
The latter works directly on System 1, using bias against other biases.  
A breaf description of some of the most known and commonly used nudges 
follows. Most of these strategies have been more or less explicitly proposed by 
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Sunstein or described in the literature (e.g. Sunstein, 2014a; Sunstein, 2014b) and 
can be included in one of the two above mentioned kind of strategies. However, 
it is important to underline that this categorisation has to be taken as purely 
exemplifying and not as a fully comprehensive toolbox.  
Default Rules. As stated in the introduction to Part 1 of the PhD thesis even not 
choosing can be considered a choice with relevant implications for public policy. 
Setting a default rule means to set an option that will be considered as the 
people’s choice, unless they decide to opt-out. This strategy has been found to be 
very effective. People, indeed, tend to don’t choose when that is possible. Within 
the field of Marketing the use of default rules to sell products is widely applied. 
For example, the subscription to a magazine may initially be offered for free or 
for very little money. After a limited period of time, if the person does not 
actively decide to unsubscribe, the offer gets automatically renewed at full price. 
The same principle has been used to promote prosocial behavior, more or less 
intentionally (e.g. Thaler & Benartzi, 2004; Johnson & Goldstein, 2004; Pichert 
& Katsikopoulos, 2008). According to the principle of Nudge, the default rule 
should be the one that is in line with individuals’ goals and values and opting out 
should be very easy, ideally by just a mouse click (Sunstein, 2014b). 
A famous study in the literature of Nudge is the one conducted by Johnson and 
Goldstein (2004) who showed for example how the default rule that regulates 
organ donations in different EU nations greatly shaped people's choice of being 
or not donors (see also Part 3, section 8.1.). 
However, it is not always easy to define which option is the favorite one of 
people. In such cases Sunstein suggested the adoption of an active choice 
(Sunstein, 2014b). Instead of being considered automatically in or out, people 
would be requested to choose the option they prefer in order to be able to 
complete a certain action.  
Simplification. While facing complex information, reducing (physically or 
conceptually) the number of options available may increase the likelihood of a 
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choice being made (Sunstein, 2014c). Simplification is characterised by reducing 
the costs needed to choose in terms of cognitive resources, time or energy. 
In his book Barry Schwartz described what he defined as “the paradox of choice” 
(Schwartz, 2016). The author claimed that in many domains maximising the 
amount of available options has been pursued as a goal in order to increase 
people's freedom to satisfy their desires. According to this vision, in the last 
decades the number of different products, and of different alternative options of 
the same product increased exponentially. Just few decades ago it was possible to 
choose among a restricted amount of different models of jeans, food, or whatever 
else product. Nowadays the number of choices are countless. Schwartz describes 
the paradoxical effects of this choice.  
On one hand, the increase in the number of available options leads to a reduction 
in customers’ satisfaction. The author attributes this effect to the fact that, when 
just few options are available, the responsibility for the choice and for the 
mistakes can be attributed to external causes (e.g. “there were not enough 
options”, “I could not find what I was looking for”). With many available 
options, all the responsibility is on the customers, that can blame no one else but 
themselves for their choice and possible mistakes. On the other hand, having to 
deal with a countless range of options can led customers to a paralysis in their 
choices. People can rely on limited cognitive resources and they are not able to 
process too much information. For this reason it gets hard for them to choose 
according to their preferences. Each choice would have pros and cons, and 
comparing it with each of the other available options of the choice set would 
require a great effort. This fact/issue also contributes to customer's dissatisfaction 
(Schwartz, 2016). 
The paradox of choice is an example of how complexity can lead to unwanted 
outcomes. Having to handle too much information, as described by Schwartz, or 
with information that is too complex for the average person, can bring 
individuals not to choose, not to participate and thus lose opportunity. That may 
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have relevant consequences at an individual and social level and leading to 
violations of the law or not voting for example.  
The term simplification is very broad and would need to be further defined. 
However, reducing complexity has been shown to be effective in promoting 
desirable behaviors in different domains such as tax payment, financial savings 
or reducing college dropout (for an extensive description about the topic see the 
book “Simpler: the future of government”, Sunstein, 2014c).   
Social Norms. The literature provides several examples on how people tend to 
behave in ways that are consistent with the ones of the social group they belong 
to. Group expectations (Festinger, 1954), social pressures toward group 
conformity (Asch, 1951; Asch, 1987) and the acquisition of reference group 
norms (Newcomb, 1957; Šarīf, 1966) have been proven to greatly shape 
individual’s behavior. By emphasising what most people do, the probability that 
those who belong to the same group will act in a similar way would most likely 
increase.  
Sunstein (2014a) underlines that in order to have greater impact the information 
provided to the people whom are addressed by the interventions should be as 
specific and local as possible for example underlining words in a text (when 
that’s possible). This would lead a big percentage of the community to act in the 
desired way (e.g. the percentage of people that pay taxes online, or vote, or 
engage in healthy behaviors). When most or many people are engaged in 
undesirable behavior this strategy can still be used by highlighting what people 
think their social group should do instead of what most people actually do (e.g. 
“90 percent of Italians think that citizens should vote” ).  
Gerber and Rogers (2009) showed the effectiveness of this strategy developing 
an intervention aiming to increase the turnout of the elections in New Jersey in 
2005 and those in California in 2006. A sample of potential voters, were divided 
into two groups, respectively "Low Turnout" and "High Turnout" and contacted 
by telephone. The first one was informed that the turnout would have been 
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probably low. The second, on the contrary, has been informed that the turnout 
would have been probably high. Although the study detected voter intentions 
rather than actual electoral behavior, the results showed that the message 
received by the voters influenced their intentions. The “High Turnout” was 
significantly higher compared to the “Low turnout”.  
Salience. Using visual or verbal stimuli can be a good strategy in order to direct 
people’s attention toward a particular option and to increase the likelihood that a 
certain option or behavior is chosen or considered. Let’s take an example 
described by Thaler and Sunstein in their book. In Amsterdam, at the airport of 
Schiphol, in order to reduce spillage has been stuck on each urinal the image of a 
black fly. This apparently irrelevant intervention reduced the spillage by 80 
percent according to the Aad Kieboom and his team who conducted the fly-in-
urinal trials (Thaler & Sunstein 2008, p. 4). As for the term simplification also 
the term salient should be probably better operationalised. However, it can be 
said that taking care of small details and to those elements of the environment 
that can be made more salient can help to promote positive behaviors. As Thaler 
and Sunstein suggest in the book, an easy rule of thumb to follow by “choice 
architects” both in the private and public sectors could be that “everything 
matters” (Thaler & Sunstein 2008, p. 4). 
Pre-commitment and Implementations of Intentions. Often people tend to 
procrastinate their actions even though they know they would benefit by 
engaging in certain behaviors. Time discounting research which studies the 
differences in the evaluation of rewards received at different points in time 
showed that present rewards have a greater impact on people's decisions than 
future ones (Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 2002). Moreover, the 
probability of this behavioral pattern has been shown to increase especially when 
people are tired, hungry, stressed, or focused on something else (Baumeister & 
Tierney, 2012).  
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Making people pre-commit to engage in certain action may lead them to act in a 
way that is consistent with what they have already committed to and thus 
(assumed to be) in line with their goals. Various examples in the literature show 
the effectiveness of this strategy to help people save more money (Thaler & 
Benartzi, 2004) or to choose healthier food (Milkman, Rogers, & Bazerman, 
2009; Read & van Leeuwen, 1998). 
Another similar strategy described by Sunstein (2014a) is to elicit people's 
intentions. Simple questions such as “did you think to act in X way? ”are often 
strategically used to make people verbalize their intention to act in a certain way 
or to remind them that it is possible to take into account an option that they may 
have ignored. 
A field experiment conducted by Milkman and colleagues (Milkman, Beshears, 
Choi, Laibson & Madrian, 2011) prompted people to form implementation 
intentions about influenza vaccination. Those who received the prompt to write 
down just a date had a vaccination rate 1.5 percentage points higher than the 
control group, which was statistically insignificant. Those who received the more 
specific prompt to write down both a date and a time had a 4.2 percentage point 
higher vaccination rate, a difference that is both statistically significant and of 
meaningful magnitude.  
Reminders. People tend to have a great deal on their minds, and when they do 
not engage in certain behaviors, that may be due to a combination of inertia, 
procrastination, competing obligations or they may be just forgetting. A reminder 
can have a positive impact on the accomplishment of certain tasks.  
Castleman and Page (2013) showed for example the effectiveness of this strategy 
in tackling relevant social issues. In US, a child born in a poor family has 9% 
probability to finish college, compared with 54% of children born in wealthy 
families. In their study the authors aimed to increase the percentage of 
subscriptions to college among non wealthy young people. A reminder was sent 
in order to remind them about the deadline for college subscriptions. The 
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intervention costed $7 per student, with an increase of 7% in college 
subscriptions among the subjects addressed in the intervention. 
Providing Feedback. In many situations people lack information to take 
informed decisions or are unaware of the long-term consequences of their 
behavior. This strategy consists of providing people with information about the 
consequences of their own past choices or about the future consequences of their 
actual behaviors. This strategy does not aim to persuade, but simply to inform: 
the individual is free to choose whatever he wants. However, before receiving the 
feedback the person was "free" to choose any option, after that he is "forced" to 
think about the consequences of his behaviors.      
Hershfield and colleagues (2011) were arguing that it is difficult for people to 
save for retirement because they cannot imagine themselves well enough at an 
older age. They made an experiment in which the participants were divided in 
two groups. To each participant of the first group (n = 50) was shown a “realistic 
age -progressed rendering” of themselves in order to stimulate their desire to 
save more. They were choosing how much they want to save on a slide bar. If the 
amount was low the picture was with a frowning face, if on the other hand, the 
amount was high the rendering was smiling. No pictures were shown to the 
second group of participants. The results showed that the first group of 
participants decided to save on average more than twice as much as the second 
group ($172 vs. $80). 
Framing Effect. The way in which the same problem is formulated could 
stimulate different choices. In this case we are talking about the framing effect 
that was first studied in the 80’s by Tversky and Kahneman (1981). A substantial 
number of studies showed the effectiveness of this strategy to change people's 
behavior (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1981, McNeil, Pauker, Sox & Tversky, 
1982; O’Connor, 1989; Stone, Yates & Parker, 1994; Hanks, Just, Smith & 
Wansink, 2012 ) 
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Framing effect can be implemented both on verbal and physical stimuli. That 
means that it is possible to influence people's choice both by proposing them the 
same options in a different frame (e.g. risk informations about a certain therapy) 
or by placing objects of the environment in different ways (e.g. moving products 
in order to make them more visible or easy to take).  
An example of “verbal frame effect” is provided by O’Connor (1989). In his 
study, the author showed, how by framing in different ways the possible outcome 
of different cancer treatment alternatives can lead patients to choose different 
therapies. On the other hand, an example of “physical frame effect” is provided 
by the studies of Hanks and colleagues (Hanks, Just, Smith & Wansink, 2012). 
By changing the position of foods in a school lunchroom, by making the 
healthier ones more visible. The authors found an increase by 18% in the choice 
of healthier food and a decrease by 28% in the choice of less healthy ones.                                    
3.1.3. Libertarian Paternalism and Freedom of Choice 
A fundamental assumption in the theory of Nudge is that the interventions should 
be designed in a way that does not preclude the freedom of choice of the 
individual. He, by definition, must be able to circumvent nudges without burdens 
or particular difficulties (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 6). Thaler and Sunstein 
refer to Nudge as a form of soft paternalism.  
One of the main critics against Thaler and Sunstein’s approach, is the 
manipulative nature of Nudge, that influence deliberately people's behavior in 
specific directions. However, the authors themselves highlighted one important 
thing, i.e. that human behavior is unavoidably influenced by contextual factors. 
Therefore, it is just possible to let the environment influence people's choices 
without changing it, or understand how to work on it in order to direct certain 
behaviors in ways that are in line with people's goals and values.  
The authors embraced the second path, proposing the term “Libertarian 
Paternalism” to underline the dual nature of Nudge interventions. The term 
"paternalism" refers to the need of deliberately influencing individual’s choices, 
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i.e. the ones considered as the most beneficial for the individual and collective 
well-being. With the term "libertarian" the authors stress on the idea to leave 
individuals free to choose alternative options, without making them excessively 
costly in terms of time or money. 
The topic of freedom is not something new in the field of BS and as discussed in 
Part 4, has been widely addressed by Burrhus F. Skinner in his book “Beyond 
Freedom and Dignity” (1971), whose thoughts on the subject are perfectly in line 
with the ideas of Thaler and Sunstein. 
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4. Boost: Historical Backdrop and Theoretical Framework 
Nudge emerged from Kahneman and Tversky’s framework and their H&B 
program (Grüne-Yanoff & Hertwig, 2015). As described in Part 1(see section 
2.2.1), the H&B program was not the only one in BE, the stream of studies of 
Gigerenzer and his SH program led to the raise of what has been defined as 
Boosting (Grüne-Yanoff & Hertwig, 2015; Hertwig & Ryall, 2016). 
According to Gigerenzer many experts think that ordinary people don’t have the 
capacity to understand information that involves logical thinking, such as 
probability or risks. Even when scientists try to educate people to outgrow their 
tendency to make errors the final effect is usually a failure. Following that line of 
thought about the “general public” the Deutsche Bank Research published “a list 
of errors that we Homer Simpsons” commit against rationality (Schneider, 2010). 
Furthermore, popular books repeat and magnify the idea that Homo sapiens is 
“predictably irrational” (e.g. Ariely, 2009) and they would need nudges in order 
to act wisely. (e.g. Thaler & Sunstein, 2008) 
Gigerenzer’s standpoint differs consistently and his criticism against the work of 
Kahneman and Tversky has been also addressed at Nudge which originated from 
their theories. The author claims that people should not be considered as poorly 
equipped to deal with logical decisions and that their intelligence is 
underestimated:  
“My story is different. People aren’t stupid. The problem is that our educational system 
has an amazing blind spot concerning risk literacy. We teach our children the 
mathematics of certainty - geometry and trigonometry - but not the mathematics of 
uncertainty, statistical thinking. And we teach our children biology but not the 
psychology that shapes their fears and desires.”  
(Gigerenzer 2015, pp.16-17). 
To clarify the author's standpoint it could be useful to describe a paradoxical 
situation that occurred after the attack of the Twin Towers on September 11, 
2001. In the following months, indeed, many Americans stopped flying and 
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started using cars in order to get to their destinations. This trend lasted for the 
next twelve months with severe consequences. The number of fatal car crashes 
increased, rising above the average of the last five years. About 1600 Americans 
lost their lives, a number that is six times higher than the total number of 
passengers (256) who died in 2001 on the fatal flights. (Gigerenzer 2015, pp. 
13-15; see also Figure 9). 
 
Figure 9. The graph shows the numbers of fatal car crashes from 2001 to the beginning of 2003 
showing a relevant increase in the twelve months that followed the terrorist attack of the Twin 
Towers. 
According to Gigerenzer, this paradoxical behavior is not the result of poor 
cognitive capacities but it is a matter of statistical illiteracy that leads people to 
overestimate (or underestimate) certain risks in specific circumstances. 
Therefore, his response to Nudging is the formulation of Boost strategies. 
4.1. Defining Boost 
The aim of Boost policies is to empower people to improve their competences by 
providing them with skills to take better decisions without pushing them in any 
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particular direction (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage 1995; Sedlmeier & Gigerenzer 
2001). Using again the example of the attack of the Twin towers, a boosting 
approach would just provide people with basic skills to understand on their own 
which are the risks of taking their car or the airplane. No strategies that 
deliberately push them to use the airplane, by taking advantage of their cognitive 
boundaries, would be implemented. 
According to Grüne-Yanoff and Hertwig (2015) it is possible to define three 
main classes of boost policies, i.e those that work on the context in which people 
take decisions; those that provide people with skills necessary to take decisions 
or that improve their knowledge; and those that design “smart strategies” that 
combine the first two policies.  
4.1.1. Working on the Context    
The literature provides evidence that most people have issues with processing 
statistical information and that can lead them to make wrong inferences about the 
information provided. (e.g. Berwick, Fineberg & Weinstein 1981; Koehler 1996). 
Several authors stressed on the point that, the way information is presented can 
greatly influence people's responses and decisions (e.g. Gigerenzer and Hoffrage 
1995; Hoffrage, Lindsey, Hertwig & Gigerenzer 2000). One way to help them 
make informed decisions is to provide information that can be easily processed 
and that can help them estimate the real probability in the occurrence of an event 
correctly. This goal can be achieved by representing the information with natural 
frequencies rather than probabilities, by providing information about risks in 
absolute rather than relative terms (Gigerenzer, Gaissmaier, Kurz-Milcke 
Schwartz & Woloshin, 2007), or by providing graphical representations of the 
information rather than numerical ones (Kurz-Milcke, Gerd Gigerenzer & Laura 
Martignon, 2008; Garćıa-Retamero, Galesic & Gigerenzer, 2010).  
4.1.2. Providing People with Skills/Knowledge 
The second group of boost policies aims to provide people with simple 
information that may be effective in dealing with specific problems or events. 
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For example the procedures to follow in case of emergencies or medical 
interventions that need to be performed within a few hours of its occurrence in 
order to be more effective in the case of a stroke. However, in different European 
countries, people recognise only few symptoms (see Mata, Frank & Gigerenzer 
2014). A boost policy could then teach the population to recognise cardinal 
symptoms of stroke in order to make them call earlier the ambulance and thus 
increase the chance that a medical intervention would have a positive outcome. 
This kind of boost policies can be seen as somehow close to the traditional 
provision of information or educational campaigns. However, this kind of boost 
policies don't aim to persuade people to change their preferences but just to 
enhance their skills with “smart strategies” that can be applied when it is 
necessary with a small effort and high effectiveness. 
4.1.3. Design of “Smart Strategies” 
In some circumstances, risks have not been or could not be measured. In these 
cases, changing the way information is presented may not be sufficient, nor 
possible. In these cases, the boosting approach designed specific tools useful to 
help people make better decisions. The Fast and Frugal trees (FFTs) are an 
example. FFTs are simplified decisional tree with at least one end node after each 
decision node (Grüne-Yanoff & Hertwig, 2015) and compared with traditional 
decision trees, the FFTs have the advantage to make faster and easier the 
decisions and to have a high degree of robustness (Luan, Schooler & Gigerenzer 
2011). An example of the use of the FFT is the one provided by Jenny and 
colleagues (Jenny et al. 2013; see Figure 10).  
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  Figure 10. The figure ( Jenny et al., 2013) shows  
  the FFT used by the authors in their intervention to 
  screen cases of clinical depression. 
The tree has been designed to improve the performance of physicians when 
screening patients for clinical cases of depression. The author simplified the 
questionnaire traditionally used that was composed by 21 questions, replacing it 
with a FFT in which just four binary questions (yes vs no) were included. The 
FFT has been found to be as effective as the two standard tools of measurement 
that required five times more cues in detecting depressed moods from 
epidemiological data.  
57
Behavioral Economics and Behavioral Change Policies
58
Behavioral Economics and Behavioral Change Policies
5. Nudge or Boost? 
Like the H&B program, Gigerenzer heavily criticised Nudge as an approach 
because it does not embrace as its goal the idea to create cultural literacy but just 
to make people act in the way that the policy makers chose to be the best 
according to some normative standard. However, Nudge theoreticians often 
highlight the need to build interventions that are fully transparent and that allow 
people to choose what they prefer. What can be surely stated is that both 
approaches have as their main goal increasing people's wellbeing. It is possible 
that in certain contexts, applying boosting policies could be harder or too 
expensive and some nudges could have more effective results. In other cases 
boost policies may be equally or more fruitful than nudges and could help to 
increase people's compliance when dealing with particularly “hot” topics. In 
other cases, nudging and Boost policies could be used jointly. A dialogue 
between the proponents of the different programs may be more beneficial for the 
scientific community and more useful in order to build knowledge and to 
improve the effectiveness of policy interventions, balancing cost and 
effectiveness of the different strategies adopted.  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Introduction 
As described in Part 2, BC policy programs and in particular Nudge, widespread 
in the last decade. The main levers of Nudge interventions that have been taken 
into account in order to develop the present researches are three: sustainability, 
generalisability and versatility.  
Sustainability. Although in many situations it is undoubtedly useful and 
necessary to build large experiments that involve a significant amount of human 
and economical resources, an important feature of Nudge is its sustainability. 
Several interventions have been developed with little or no costs and that is one 
of the reasons that brought the discipline into the mainstream of public policy, 
gathering the attention of several governments around the world. The collection 
of studies proposed here aimed to keep into account this feature of low cost, and 
therefore all the interventions were developed and executed extremely 
economically. 
Generalisability. Although the literature about Nudge proved its effectiveness 
under various conditions, great consideration was taken in terms of 
generalisability of the results. For this reason it has been decided to replicate the 
experiments in other cultural contexts (study 1) or to implement the interventions 
in different cultural settings (study 3). The other studies are still in the phase of 
replication and the results will be available in the near future.  
Versatility. There is a reason why the researches described are focused on 
different issues. Nudge is a discipline that showed its multifaceted nature and its 
flexibility in tackling issues from a broad range of domains. That’s probably one 
of the main reasons of its spreading all over the world. In Italy, however, little 
has been done yet, and testing the effectiveness of Nudge in different fields may 
be useful to gather the attention around the discipline.  
Part 3: an overview. The third part of this PhD thesis describes the stream of 
studies carried out by the author and his research group.  
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The researches have been divided into two categories: studies about preferences 
(N=2) and studies about choices (N=3). The distinction between “preference” 
and “choice” is purely arbitrary and the wording was chosen just in order to 
distinguish between the experiments that did not involve an actual choice (i.e. 
subjects did not have to “physically” choose a real product nor behavior) to the 
ones in which actual choices were required (people had to emit an actual choice 
or behavior). Each research will be presented as a short paper. 
The two studies about preferences aim to explore some processes described in 
Part 1 of the PhD thesis in relation to the BE framework. These studies have been 
carried out with populations of students in a controlled setting. The first one 
takes into account the so called “decoy effect”, with the replication of a study 
carried out in another cultural context. The second one is focused on the framing 
effect, and more precisely on how different risk frames may lead to different 
perceptions of risk.  
The three studies about choices aim to apply the principles of Nudge described in 
Part 2 of the thesis in the Italian context. The interventions are part of a project 
called “Nudge and well-being”. These are field experiments in which actual 
choices were observed. The term well-being here is taken in its broadest meaning 
and has been used on purpose to underline the versatility of the discipline. The 
first intervention was implemented to tackle the problem of food waste in the 
Italian restaurants. The study has been presented in the EABA conference in 
2016. The study has been replicated in different cultural contexts and the results 
is discussed as well. The second is a pilot study developed to reduce the usage of 
smartphones in two pubs in Milan, Italy. Lastly an intervention for the reduction 
of the consumption of sugar in a coffee shop in Catania (Italy) is presented. 
. 
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7. Studies about Preferences 
7.1. Decoy Effect and customer preferences for newspaper subscriptions:  
A Randomized Controlled Trial 
Abstract 
The study is a replication of an experiment carried out by Kivetz, Netzer and Srinivasan (2004) 
to show the so called “decoy effect”. A randomized controlled trial was carried out in a 
population of students (N=114). The sample, has been divided into two groups which have been 
provided with one of two versions of a test. The first one included two possible options for a 
subscription to a newspaper. The second one included additionally a third option. Following the 
independence axiom, people's preferences should not change when a third option is introduced 
in the choice set. However, we hypothesised that the third option would affect students’ choices 
acting as a decoy. Results confirmed the hypothesis showing an asymmetrically dominated 
choice among the students. 
Keywords: asymmetrically dominated choice; decoy effect; preferences; 
subscriptions       
According to the literature, individual preferences are based on what is offered 
rather than based on absolute preferences (e.g. Ariely & Wallsten, 1995; Herne, 
1999). Among the systematic bias studied during the years, several behavioral 
economists addressed what has been defined as “decoy effect”, technically 
known as an asymmetrically dominated choice. That occurs when people’s 
preference for one option over another changes as a result of adding a third one 
(Bateman, Munro, & Poe, 2008). The asymmetrically dominated option is a 
“decoy” that increases the preference for the dominating option.  
In 2004 a group of researchers developed an experiment with the students of a 
Master program in Business Administration (Kivetz, Netzer, & Srinivasan, 
2004). The experiment was based on a real situation that happened in 1997. The 
weekly newspaper “The Economist” offered to their customers the opportunity to 
choose between three possible subscriptions, i.e. online, printed or combined 
(both printed and online). The price for the first option was $59, while for both 
the second and the third ones was $125 (see Figure 11). 
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Figure 11. The figure represents the offer promoted on the website of 
“The Economist” in 1997. The second and the third options have the 
same price, although the latter includes both the first and the second 
option.  
Clearly the second option was not providing any advantages for the customers. 
However, the researchers hypothesised that it would affect their preferences. 
Two groups of students were provided with different versions of the offer. One 
group received the same one proposed by “The Economist” while the other group 
was provided with just two options i.e. the digital and the combined ones. The 
researchers found that, in the first case, 72% of the students opted for the 
combined option while in the second case just 43% of the students choose it.  
To sum up, taking out from the choice set the option that no one would have 
chosen (i.e. $125 for the print subscription) resulted in changing people's 
preferences. This findings are in contrast with the axiom of independence that 
claim that if an option A is preferred over an option B in a choice set that 
includes A and B, introducing a third option C and thus expanding the choice set 
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to A,B and C, must not lead to a preference reversal making B preferred over A. 
Thus, if the digital option was preferred over the combined one, adding a third 
option, i.e. the printed one, should not have changed the preferences of the 
students.  
The present study is a replication of “The Economist experiment” adapted to the 
Italian context. The aim was to test the generalisability of the results obtained by 
Kivetz, Netzer and Srinivasan (2004) in another cultural context. According to 
the original findings, it has been hypothesised that similarly in the Italian context, 
the preferences of the subjects of the the study would have been influenced by 
the decoy and their preferences would change according to the version of the 
options provided. 
7.1.1. Materials and Method 
Setting and Sample 
The data was gathered in a classroom of IULM (International University of 
Languages and Media) in Milan on a sample of 114 students aged between 20 
and 35. Between them 19 (16.7%) were males and 95 (83.3%) were females. The 
mean age was 21.31 (SD=2.06) 
Ethical approval: All procedures performed in the study were in accordance with 
the ethical standards of the institutional and/or national research committee and 
with the 1964 Helsinki declaration and its later amendments or comparable 
ethical standards. 
Materials 
Papers with the two versions of the task were printed and randomly assigned to 
the students in order to assess their preferences. Each student received two 
stapled papers. The first one was a cover paper on which they had to write their 
age and gender. On the second there was the version of the task. The “version A” 
counted three options while the “version B” counted just two options. 
The two versions were as follows (see Appendix A for the original versions of the 
task): 
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Version A: 
Suppose that you want to subscribe to a magazine of your interest.  
You have 3 possible options. 
Trace and put an x on the side of your favorite one: 
A: € 59: digital subscription 
B: € 125: printed subscription 
C: € 125: printed + digital subscription 
Version B: 
Suppose that you want to subscribe to a magazine of your interest. 
You have 2 possible options. 
Trace and put an x on the side of your favorite one: 
A € 59: digital subscription 
B € 125: printed + digital subscription  
Experimental design 
A between groups plan was implemented, with an independent variable (version 
A vs. version B) and two independent groups. The dependent variable was the 
students preferences. 
Outcome Measure 
The dependent variable (outcome) was the students’ preference (digital 
subscription choice vs. printed + digital subscription). 
Procedure 
The two versions of the task were assigned randomly among the students so that 
56 (49.1%) students received the version A while 58 (50.9%) the version B. The 
students had 40 seconds to complete the task. 
7.1.2. Results 
The student’s preferences in the two versions are reported in Figure 12. 
Comparing the answers provided in the two versions of the task the data shows a 
reversal pattern among students’ preferences.  
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Figure 12. The percentage of students’ preferences for each of the available options in Version 
A and Version B of the task are shown in the pie-charts. 
Participants chose differently in the two experimental conditions (Chi-square (1) 
= 5.90; p=0.015). Among the students who received the version A of the task 
(three options) 19 (43.2%) chose the digital option while 25 (56.8%) chose the 
combined one. Among the students who received the version B (two options), 39 
(67.2%) chose the digital option while 19 (32.8%) choose the combined one 
(Figure 13). The effect size showed that the likelihood of choosing the digital 
option was about 2.5 times higher in the two options version compared with the 
three options one (OR = 2.70; 95% CI: 1.20-6.07). On the contrary, the 
likelihood of choosing the digital option was about 60% less when the third 
option was provided. (OR=0.37; 95% CI: 0.16-0.82). 
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Figure 13. The percentage of students’ preferences for the digital or the combined (digital
+printed) options in version A and version B of the task are shown in the histograms. In version 
A were taken into account just the data of the students who chose the digital or the combined 
option, while those who choose the paper option were excluded by the analysis. 
7.1.3. Discussion 
The replication confirmed the hypothesis showing an asymmetrical dominated 
choice among the students with a preference reversal among the two versions of 
the task. A significantly higher percentage of students chose the digital option 
compared to the combined one in the version that included just two options. The 
opposite trend was observed among students who received the three options 
version. The preference for the digital option raised by 24% when just two 
options were presented. The data confirms that the same trend of results that was 
found in the original experiment. Results seems to be culture independent and 
generalisable in other contexts, or at least in the Italian one.  
The main limitations of the study are two. First, while the experiment assessed 
students’ preferences, it did not measure their actual choice. The difference in the 
price between the digital option and the combined one is relevant. The subjects 
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who received the version A may have stated that they would have preferred the 
combined option, but in a real life choice context they may have opted for the 
digital option. Second, the results have been tested on a population of students as 
in the original experiment. Most of the students in the present experiment were 
females. It would be interesting to test the same problem with a sample of normal 
population in order to have more generalisable results.  
Conflict of Interests: The authors declare that they have no conflict of interests.  
7.1.4. References 
Ariely, D., & Wallsten, T. (1995). Seeking subjective dominance in 
multidimensional space: An explanation of the asymmetric dominance effect. 
Organizational Behavior And Human Decision Processes, 63(3), 223-232. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1006/obhd.1995.1075 
Bateman, I. J., Munro, A., & Poe, G. L. (2008). Decoy effects in choice 
experiments and contingent valuation: asymmetric dominance. Land Economics, 
84(1), 115-127. http://dx.doi.org/10.3368/le.84.1.115 
Herne, K. (1999). The effects of decoy gambles on individual choice. 
Experimental Economics, 2(1), 31-40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01669133 
Kivetz, R., Netzer, O., & Srinivasan, V. (2004). Extending compromise effect 
models to complex buying situations and other context effects. Journal of 
Marketing Research, 41(3), 262-268. https://doi.org/10.1509/jmkr.
41.3.262.35993 
71
Behavioral Economics and Behavioral Change Policies
72
Behavioral Economics and Behavioral Change Policies
7.2. Relative and Absolute framing: a Randomized Controlled Trial to 
evaluate the risk perception about incidence of colorectal cancer by 
consuming processed meat 
Abstract 
A randomised controlled trial was carried out in a population of students (N=130) in order to 
assess their perception of the risk to contract colorectal cancer among daily consumers of 
processed meat. In the study were provided two versions of the problem: a “Relative Risk 
Frame” (RRF) and an “Absolute Risk Frame” (ARF) ones. Both versions provided four possible 
answers including only one correct. 
We hypothesised that a higher percentage of students would have answered correctly to the 
problem when it was provided in an ARF vs. RRF version. Moreover, we hypothesised that 
those provided with the ARF version would have an overall lower perception of the risks 
compared with those provided with the RRF version. The results confirmed both hypotheses. 
Keywords: framing; risk perception; processed meat; colorectal cancer 
In one of his papers Gigerenzer and colleagues (2007) described a phenomena 
that defines “collective statistical illiteracy”. That simply means that most of the 
people are not able to understand the meaning of numbers and statistical 
inferences. According to the author, statistical literacy is of great importance for 
individuals in order to face a technological democracy, listing a series of 
examples useful to understand how the framing of informations may change 
people's choices.  
Relevant for the purpose of the present study can be an event that happened In 
October 1995. The U.K. Committee on Safety of Medicines claimed that third-
generation oral contraceptive pills increased the risk of potentially life-
threatening blood clots in the legs or lungs by 100%. The information spread fast 
and exponentially among practitioners and was presented in an emergency 
announcement by mass media.  
The huge impact of the news was followed by a decrease in the consumption of 
the pills by women, scarred by the potential threat. This led to an increase in 
unwanted pregnancies and to 13,000 additional abortions in England and Wales 
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in the following year (see Figure 14). Moreover the cost of providing abortion for 
National Health Service increased by $70 million at that time (Furedi, 1999). 
As highlighted by Gigerenzer, this situation was caused by a misleading frame of 
information. Indeed, the claimed risk due to the consumption of the third 
generation contraceptive pill was compared with cases of thrombosis due to the 
use of second generation contraceptive pills. In other words, 1 woman out of 
7000 had thrombosis as a result of the pill. The number increased to 2 among 
those women who took the third generation pill. Although the information 
provided by the U.K. Committee on Safety of Medicines and by the media was 
true, the information was framed in relative terms producing panic with the 
described above consequences. The increase of 100% in absolute terms was 
actually extremely small (from about 0,014% to 0,028%).  
 
Figure 14. The number of abortion in the decades 1990-2000 in England and Wale are 
represented in the graph (Gigerenzer, 2015) showing an increase in its incidence after the 
information about the increased risk of taking the third generation pills was released and spread 
among the citizens.  
This example shows extremely well how people’s incompetence of 
understanding statistical notions can greatly influence their choices with 
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important implications for their health and for the economy. Another important 
point is that cases like that could be an unintentional result of the lack of 
understanding about the statistical illiteracy of common people by those 
spreading the information, but also an intentional strategy to push people’s 
choices and preferences in certain directions.  
The present study will address the topic of risk framing, in relation to the risk of 
contracting cancer. In October 2015, the World Health Organization, warned 
people about the 18% increase in the risk of contracting colorectal cancer by 
consuming 50g of processed meat on a daily basis (see also Bouvard et al., 2015; 
McGuire, 2016). Similarly to what happened with the case of the third generation 
pills, the mass media shared the news. However, the risk was compared to the 
overall risk of contracting colorectal cancer in the normal population, that was 
about 5%. That means that in absolute terms, the risk increased from about 5% to 
6%.  
In the present study it has been hypothesised that the number of people that are 
able to estimate correctly the percentage of the risk would change according to 
the proposed frame. A higher number of correct answers is expected with ARF 
compared to RRF. 
7.2.1. Materials and Method 
Setting and sample 
The data was gathered in a classroom at IULM (International University of 
Languages and Media) in Milan from a sample of 130 students aged between 20 
and 35. Between them 23 (17.7%) were males and 107 (82.3%) were females. 
The mean age was 21.41 (SD=2.02). 
Ethical approval: All procedures performed in the study were in accordance with 
the ethical standards of the institutional and/or national research committee and 
with the 1964 Helsinki declaration and its later amendments or comparable 
ethical standards. 
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Materials 
Papers with the two versions of the task were printed in order to assess student’s 
preferences. Each student received two stapled papers. The first one was a cover 
paper on which they had to write their age and gender. On the second there was 
one of the two versions of the task. In the “version A” risk was framed in relative 
terms, while the “version B” was framed in absolute terms. Both versions had 
four possible answers, including the only one correct answer (answer C: about 6). 
The two versions of the problem were as follows (see Appendix B for the 
original versions of the tasks): 
Version A: 
For people who never eat processed meat, the risk to contract colorectal cancer 
during their life is 5%. 
For people who eat 50g of processed meat everyday, the relative risk to contract 
colorectal cancer during their life increases by 18%. 
Out of 100 people, how many, probably would contract colorectal cancer during 
their life by eating 50g of processed meat everyday? 
A about  5 B about 18 C about 6  D  about 23  
Version B: 
For people who never eat processed meat, the risk to contract colorectal cancer 
during their life is 5%. 
For people who eat 50g of processed meat everyday, the risk to contract 
colorectal cancer during their life increases by 1%. 
Out of 100 people, how many, probably would contract a colorectal cancer 
during their life by eating 50g of processed meat everyday? 
A about  5 B about 18  C about 6 D  about 23  
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Experimental design 
A between groups plan was implemented, with an independent variable (version 
A vs. version B) and two independent groups. The dependent variable was the 
student’s answer to the problem. 
Outcome Measures 
The primary outcome was the percentage of students’ correct answer to the task 
(answer C: about 6). 
The secondary outcome was the percentage of students who had a low risk 
perception, according to two possible clusters of answers (Low Risk Cluster 
(LRC): students who responded A or C, i.e. 5 or 6; High Risk Cluster (HRC): 
students who responded B or D, i.e. 18 or 23) 
Procedure 
The two versions of the task were assigned randomly among the students so that 
66 (50.8%) students received the version A, while 64 (49.2%) the version B. The 
students were asked to answer correctly to the assignment, i.e. to write an X close 
to the number of people who probably would have contracted colorectal cancer, 
according to the data provided in the task. The students completed the 
assignment under time pressure. They had 40 seconds to complete the task. 
7.2.2. Results 
The student’s answers of the two versions are reported in Figure 15. Taking into 
account the primary outcome measure, i.e. the percentage of students who choose 
the correct answer, results show a significant difference in the rate of correct 
answers to the two versions of the task (Chi-square(1) = 8.31; p=0.004).  
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Figure 15. The percentages of students who choose each of the possible answers in the version 
A and in the version B of the task are represented in the pie charts. 
Among the students who received the version A (RRF) 9 (13.6%) chose the 
correct option (answer C: about 6; see Figure 16). Among the students who 
received the version B (ARF) 22 (35.5%).  
The effect size showed that the likelihood to choose the correct option was about 
3.5 times higher in the version B compared with the version A (OR =3.48; 95% 
CI:1.45-8.33). 
 
             Figure 16. The percentage of correct answers  
            in the Version A and the Version B of the tasks  
                         is shown in the histograms.  
78
Behavioral Economics and Behavioral Change Policies
Taking into account the secondary outcome measure, differences were found in 
the two experimental conditions (Chi-square(1) = 26.47; p<0.001). Among the 
students who received the version A of the task, 13 (19.7%) chose one of the 
options included the LRC, while 53 (80.3%) choose one of the options included 
in the HRC. Among the students who received the version B, 40 (64.5%) chose 
one of the options included the LRC, while 22 (35.5%) chose one of the options 
included in the HRC. The effect size showed that the likelihood to choose the 
LRC was about 7.5 times higher in the version B compared with the version A 
(OR = 7.4; 95% CI: 3.3-16.6) 
Moreover, analysing the error distribution differences were found (chi-square(1)= 
20.93 p<0.001). Post hoc shows that the likelihood to choose option B instead of 
option D is similar in the two groups (p=0.172); the likelihood to choose option 
B instead of option A is higher in the version A rather than in version B 
(p<0.001); finally, the likelihood to to choose option D instead of option A is 
higher in the version A rather than in version B (p<0.001).      
7.2.3. Discussion 
The study confirmed the hypothesis, showing that a significantly higher 
percentage of students choose the correct answer when they received the ARF 
version (version B), compared with the RRF one (version A).  
Results were even more clear when the options of the problem were grouped into 
clusters. More than 60% of the students who received the version B showed a 
“low risk” perception while, among the ones who received the version A, about 
80% showed a “high risk” perception value. 
The study presents some main limitations and some points could be further 
addressed in future researches.  
The experiment assessed the students’ understanding of the problem, however, it 
did not measure any actual choice. It would be useful to test whether the answers 
provided by the students are consistent with their choices. For example, it would 
be interesting to see if the students who showed an high risk perception have an 
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higher tendency to avoid to buy or to eat processed meat compared with those 
who showed a low risk perception. 
The results have been tested on a population of students, most of whom were 
females. Testing the same problem with a more homogenous sample would be 
helpful to understand if the data could be generalised to the population.  
Further experiments may test if students’ answers are significantly influenced by 
the time constraint or are time independent.  
Finally, further experiments may assess if the subject matter of the problem 
influenced people’s way to answer. For example it could be tested if the same 
pattern of answers will result when replacing the information that highlights the 
risks of certain products/behaviors, with information that highlights the benefits. 
That could provide useful guidelines on how to communicate risks and benefits. 
It could help to set interventions that promote desirable choices, for example 
providing relative frames when talking about protective factors, and absolute 
frames when talking about risks. 
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8. Studies about Choices 
8.1. No waste by default: Nudging to prevent food waste in restaurants 
Abstract 
Nudge techniques concern any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people's behavior in a 
predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic 
incentives. In order to tackle the problem of food waste in restaurants, three studies were carried 
in three different cultural settings: Italy, Switzerland and Greece. 
Study one was conducted in a pizzeria close to Milan. In the intervention customers were 
provided with informations about food waste. Additionally the default rule was manipulated so 
that, when customers had uneaten food in their plates, they were automatically provided with a 
“doggy bag”, unless they actively chose to opt out. Study two was a replication of the Italian 
trial in a restaurant close to Lugano, Switzerland. The data showed that in both studies the 
number of doggy bags provided to the customers increased significantly during the 
experimental condition. Study three was conducted in a restaurant close to Thessaloniki, 
Greece, providing the customers just with information about food waste and about the 
possibility to ask for the the doggy bag. No significant effect was found in this study. 
Keywords: food waste; nudge; default rule; leftovers; doggy bag 
As stated by Sunstein and Thaler it could be considered as nudge: “any aspect of 
the choice architecture that alters people's behavior in a predictable way without 
forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic 
incentives” (Sunstein and Thaler, 2008, p. 6). From a behavioral standpoint this 
definition stresses on some main points. Nudge is any deliberate attempt to 1) 
work on the context 2) in order to alter the probability of emission of a behavior, 
3) influencing it in a predictable way, 4) without punishing alternative behavioral 
responses and suppressing alternative choices or providing significant economic 
rewards.  
Although not explicitly stated by Sunstein, the majority of the techniques used in 
Nudge interventions are mainly focused on antecedents modification, in order to 
set the occasion for emitting the desired behavior (Sunstein, 2014). The literature 
shows the effectiveness of Nudge in facing problems in many different domains 
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from social policies to sustainability (e.g. Bailenson 2011; Hershfield et al. 2011; 
Costa & Kahn 2013; Kallbekken, Sælen & Hermansen 2013) using a broad range 
of techniques in order to promote prosocial behaviors. Among these the 
manipulation of the default rule turned out to be effective in different case studies 
in promoting desirable behaviors (e.g. Johnson & Goldstein, 2003; Pichert & 
Katsikopoulos, 2008; Keller et al. 2011) according to the idea of libertarian 
paternalism. 
An example of how default rule works is a study carried out by Johnson and 
Goldstein (2004) in which the authors found that the percentage of organ donors 
in the EU countries was distributed following two patterns. The countries where 
people had to actively choose to become organ donors (opt-in) showed a very 
low percentage of donors. Conversely in the countries in which people were 
considered by default organ donors, unless they actively choose to opt-out the 
percentage was much higher, in many countries close to 100% (see Figure 17). 
 
             Figure 17. The histograms show the percentage of organ donors in different 
             EU countries.  
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Although, in the last decade many studies have been conducted trying to change 
socially relevant behaviors through “nudge techniques”, there are fields that still 
remain unexplored, and one of them is the food waste issue. In recent years the 
that has been a hot issue within the international community (FAO, 2011; FAO, 
2013) suggesting that about one third of the produced food gets wasted every 
year worldwide (FAO, 2013; Monier et al., 2011; Gustavsson et al., 2011). Today 
around 34% of food consumption takes place out of the home and one third of it 
in public places like restaurants (Coldiretti et al., 2010; Fontanelli et al., 2011; 
Segrè et al., 2011). Unfortunately, in the restaurants not all the food ordered by 
the customers is being consumed, so leftovers are often thrown away. Reducing 
the amount of leftovers thrown away could have a significant economical and 
environmental impact on a large scale (CE, 2014; Thönissen, 2009; FAO,2013).  
In Italy a law (n. 166/16) to tackle food waste has been recently approved. 
Specifically, Article 9 refers to the reduction of waste in restaurants and to the 
increase of the availability of “doggy bags”. In Italy, according to a survey made 
by Coldiretti (2010) around 21% of food waste comes from restaurants and one 
of the sources of waste is leftovers (Parfitt et al., 2010). Usually, clients have to 
actively ask the waiters to pack their leftovers into the so called “doggy bags”, 
and surveys show that only 36% of customers ask for their leftovers. (Paladino, 
2015; Gaiani, 2013; Coldiretti, 2016).  
A first study was implemented in Italy and aimed to test the effectiveness of the 
default rule to reduce food waste in a pizzeria. It was hypothesised that by 
automatically providing people with a “doggy bag” (or “foodie bag”)  when they 6
have leftovers in their plates would increase their use. Following, a second study 
was in a Swiss restaurant to test the generalisability of the results found in the 
first study. Finally, the third study tested the effectiveness of an informative 
approach, providing the customers just with information about food waste and 
 In the study the “doggy bags” were renamed as “foodie bag”, so the two terms will be used 6
interchangeably in the PhD thesis.
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about the possibility to ask for a doggy bag. It was hypothesised that there would 
be a milder effect compared to the one obtained by manipulating the default rule. 
The three studies will be presented separately in the next sections. 
8.1.1. Study 1: reducing food waste in an Italian pizzeria 
8.1.1.1. Materials and Method 
Setting 
The data was collected at dinner time, from 7.00 P.M. to 12.00 A.M. in a small 
restaurant close to Milan, Italy, hosting around 55 to 60 people per meal. The 
restaurant was mostly serving pizza which was chosen as the target food for the 
experiment. Considering that the measurements were self-reported, a context 
with a small number of customers was chosen in order to increase the reliability 
of the data collected during the intervention. Indeed, in a bigger restaurant a 
higher number of employees would have been involved in gathering data, 
therefore, increasing the risk of mistakes.  
Ethical approval: All procedures performed in the study were in accordance to 
the ethical standards of the institutional and/or national research committee and 
with the 1964 Helsinki declaration and its later amendments or comparable 
ethical standards. 
Materials 
In order to manipulate the default rule one double-sided poker chip was used, 
placed in front of each client in the restaurant. The chip was green on one side 
and red on the other. To make the rationale of the intervention easily 
understandable for the customers were developed table centerpieces (see 
Appendix C1) with instructions about what to do with the poker-chip in order to 
obtain the foodie bag. Moreover, were developed flyers placed in the menus with 
information about food waste and the same set of instructions available on the 
centerpieces (see Appendix C3 ).  
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Measures 
The restaurant staff was provided with an observational grid placed in the kitchen 
on which they were trained to note an “X” for any plate with leftovers (see 
Appendix C5). To collect the data about the demand of “doggy bags”, were 
provided stickers to be put on each doggy bag given to the customers. In this way 
it was possible to easily count the number of doggy bags demanded during each 
phase of the research. During the experiment any plates with inside at least one 
slice of pizza was considered as leftovers. 
Procedures 
The data was collected for one month: two weeks for the control phase and two 
weeks for the experimental one. During the control phase it was simply measured 
the demand of doggy bags as described above. 
During the experimental phase, the double-sided poker chips were placed on the 
tables in front of each client, with the green side up,. To request a doggy bag, the 
clients just had to leave the chip on the green side (default rule), otherwise, they 
had to turn the red side up. The centerpiece was placed on each table, and the 
flyer with the instructions was placed inside each menu. 
Experimental design. 
Between groups plan was implemented, with an independent variable 
(intervention vs. nonintervention) and two independent groups, with repeated 
measures on the dependent variable. The dependent variable was the number of 
doggy bags requested by the customers. 
8.1.1.2. Results 
Overall, 46 and 40 plates with leftovers were left in the control phase and in the 
experimental phase respectively. In the control phase nineteen costumers (41%) 
asked for the doggy bag, and in the experimental phase thirty four costumers 
(85%) asked for the doggy bag. A chi-square test was used in order to compare 
the data in the two conditions. The demand of doggy bags was 44% higher 
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during the experimental phase compared with the control one (Figure 18). The 
difference showed to be statistically significant (Chi-square(1) = 17.27 p < .001), 
and the effect size showed that in the experimental phase the likelihood of 
demanding a “doggy bag” was about 8 times higher than in the control phase 
(OR = 8.05; 95% CI: 2.82-22.96). 
 
Figure 18. The histograms show the percentage of subjects who chose the doggy bag out of the 
overall number of people who had leftovers in their plates at the end of the dinner. 
8.1.2. Study 2: reducing food waste in an Swiss restaurant 
Study 2 was a replication of the Italian trial in a Swiss restaurant. The aim was to 
test the generalisability of the results in another cultural setting. 
8.1.2.1. Materials and Method 
Setting 
The data was collected both at lunch and dinner time, from 12.00 P.M. to 3.00 
P.M and from 7.00 PM to 12.00 A.M. in a Swiss restaurant close to Lugano 
hosting around 100 people per meal. The main difference in the Swiss trial was 
that the restaurant was not serving just pizza, but different kinds of dishes. 
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Ethical approval: All procedures performed in the study were in accordance to 
the ethical standards of the institutional and/or national research committee and 
with the 1964 Helsinki declaration and its later amendments or comparable 
ethical standards. 
Materials 
The same materials of the Italian trial were provided to the owner of the 
restaurant.The information about the overall food waste on the centrepiece and 
the menu flyers was replaced with the relevant one for Switzerland. During the 
experiment any plate with at least one slice of pizza left was considered as 
leftovers. For the other dishes, waiters were trained to count as leftovers those 
plates in which there was about ⅓ of food left. For that reason were provided 
guidelines with verbal instructions and images that showed the waiters what to 
consider as leftovers (see Appendix C4).  
Measures 
The number of leftovers and the number of people who requested them was 
measured as in the Italian trial by using stickers. 
Procedures 
The procedure was the same as in the Italian trial. However, the data was 
gathered just for two weeks (one week for the control phase, one week for the 
experimental one). The length of the overall period of the intervention was 
chosen according to the availability of the owners of the restaurant. 
Experimental design 
A between groups plan was implemented, with an independent variable 
(intervention vs. nonintervention) and two independent groups, with repeated 
measures on the dependent variable. The dependent variable was the number of 
doggy bags requested by the customers. 
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8.1.2.2. Results 
Overall 38 and and 35 plates with leftovers were left during the control phase and 
during the intervention phase respectively. During the control phase fifteen 
costumers (39%) asked for the doggy bag, and during the intervention phase 
twenty-five customers (71%) asked for the doggy bag (Figure 19). A chi-square 
test was used in order to compare the data in the two conditions. The demand of 
doggy bags was 32% higher during the experimental phase compared to the 
control one (Figure 5). The difference showed to be statistically significant (Chi-
square(1) = 7.51 p = .006), and the effect size showed that in the experimental 
phase the likelihood of demanding a “doggy bag” was almost 4 times higher than 
in the control phase (OR = 3.83; 95% CI: 1.44-10.22). 
 
Figure 19. The histograms show the percentage of subjects who chose to ask for the doggy bag 
out of the overall number of people who had leftovers in their plates at the end of the meal. 
8.1.3. Study 3: reducing food waste in a Greek restaurant 
Study 3 was carried out in Thessaloniki, Greece and aimed to test the 
effectiveness of information and default rule separately. The initial hypothesis 
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was that the food waste information condition would have a slightly bigger effect 
compared to the control condition and that the default would have a greater effect 
compared to the information only phase. However, just the food waste 
information phase was carried out due to the unavailability of the restaurant to 
implement the default phase. So just the first hypothesis was tested. 
8.1.3.1. Materials and Method 
Setting 
The data was collected during the whole opening time, from 12 P.M. to 8 P.M. in 
a Greek restaurant close to Thessaloniki hosting around 60 people per meal. 
Similar to the Swiss trial and different from the Italian trial, the restaurant was 
not serving just pizza, but different kinds of dishes. 
Ethical approval: All procedures performed in the study were in accordance to 
the ethical standards of the institutional and/or national research committee and 
with the 1964 Helsinki declaration and its later amendments or comparable 
ethical standards. 
Materials 
Differently to the Italian and Swiss trials, on the materials were reported just the 
informations about food waste and a verbal instruction, i.e. “ask for your Foodie 
Bag!” (see Appendix C2). Only the centrepieces with information about the 
overall food waste in Greece were used (written both in Greek and English). 
During the experiment any plates with inside at least one slice of pizza were 
considered as leftovers. For the other dishes, waiters were trained to consider as 
leftovers when in the plate there was about ⅓ of food left as in the Swiss trial. 
Guidelines with verbal instructions and images that showed the waiters what to 
consider as leftovers were provided.  
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Measures 
The number of leftovers and the number of people who requested them was 
measured as in the Italian trial by using stickers. 
Procedures 
The procedure was the same as in the Italian trial and the data was gathered for a 
total amount of four weeks (two for the control phase and two for the 
experimental one). 
Experimental design 
A between groups plan was implemented, with an independent variable 
(intervention vs. nonintervention) and two independent groups, with repeated 
measures on the dependent variable. The dependent variable was the number of 
doggy bags requested by the customers. 
8.1.3.2. Results 
Overall, 57 and and 108 plates with leftovers were left in the control phase and in 
the intervention phase respectively. In the control phase 40 customers (70.2%) 
asked for a doggy bag, and in the intervention phase 87 customers (80.5%) asked 
for the doggy bag (Figure 20). A chi-square test was used in order to compare the 
data in the two conditions. The demand of doggy bags was 10% higher during 
the experimental phase compared to the control one. However, the difference 
showed not to be statistically significantly (Chi-square(1) = 1.72 p = 0.189). 
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Figure 20. The histograms shows the percentage of subjects who chose the doggy bag out of the 
overall number of people who had leftovers in their plates at the end of their meals. 
8.1.4. Discussion 
The importance of the context to influence people’s behavior is crucial when 
talking about Nudge. Study 1 and study 2 supported the experimental hypothesis 
with a statistically significant difference between the control and the 
experimental phase in the request of doggy bags (overall OR=5.55; 95% 
CI=2.7-10.99). By manipulating the default rule the probability that a customer 
with leftovers in his plate would ask for a doggy bag increased in the 
experimental condition compared to the control one. As Johnson and Goldstein 
(2004) showed in their work, default rules seem to affect people’s behaviors 
independent of their cultural background. Taken together, results of study 1 and 2 
seem to support this assumption. Furthermore the percentage of people who 
asked for a doggy bag in the control phase (p=0.52) and in the experimental 
phase (p=0.17) was similar in the Italian and Swiss contexts  
However in the first two studies, the intervention did not allow us to discriminate 
which part of the intervention works: the informative part (i.e. the informations 
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about food waste) or the “pure nudging intervention”(i.e. the default rule 
manipulation obtained by using the poker-chips).  
For this reason has been implemented the third study, that partially addressed the 
above mentioned issue. Results showed that providing the customers just with 
informations about food waste, is ineffective in increasing the demand of doggy 
bags. However the results could be explained by the higher percentage of 
customers who asked for the doggy bag in the control phase of the Greek study 
(72%). compared to the ones found in the Italian study (41%) and in the Swiss 
one (39%). The difference may be due to an overall cultural difference in Greece 
compared with Italy and Switzerland so that Greek customers could be in general 
more prone to ask for leftovers and an intervention in that cultural background 
could be unnecessary. In order to have meaningful evidences about the 
effectiveness of a mere informational approach it would be necessary to test it in 
settings that have a comparable initial percentage of customers who require the 
doggy bags to the ones of the Italian and Swiss trials. Another issue in the Greek 
trial is the huge difference found between the conditions in the overall number of 
leftovers. It is highly possible that some unpredicted variable interfered during 
the data gathering. 
Taking into account the overall results of the three studies, it is possible to say 
that manipulating the default rule appeared to be effective and sustainable to deal 
with the problem of food waste in restaurants, while the effectiveness of a mere 
informative approach should be further tested. The results of the present paper 
should be interpreted keeping in mind that the study population was fairly small. 
To conclude, further studies should assess the actual behavior of people after they 
received their doggy bag. It would be of interest to understand if customers who 
received the doggy bag effectively eat the leftovers in a future moment or throw 
them away. 
Conflict of Interests: The authors declare that they have no conflict of interests.  
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8.2. Digital Detox: preliminary findings of a Nudge intervention to reduce 
the usage of digital devices in social contexts 
Abstract 
In recent years, the development of new information and communication technologies (ICT) 
produced radical changes in interpersonal interactions and exerted a growing influence on 
human behavior. The widespread of digital devices led to their omnipresence in different 
contexts including those appointed for socialisation like pubs and restaurants. An intervention 
was developed in order to reduce the frequency of smartphones use by the customers of one pub 
in Milan. In the center of each table were placed baskets for the customers to put their 
smartphones inside. In order to prompt the clients to use the baskets, on them were stick inviting 
labels with the image of a smartphone and a slogan. The data of the frequency of use of the 
digital devices was measured before and after the baskets were placed on the tables. The results 
of the experimental phase showed higher percentage of time in which none of the subjects 
included in a specific Statistical Unit (SU) interacted with their smartphone and a lower 
percentage of time in which every subject included in a specific SU interacted with their 
smartphone. 
Keywords: digital detox; nudge; salience;  smartphone 
In the last decades information and communication technologies (ICT) 
widespread all over the world. Smartphones, in particular, changed their function 
from being mere communication gadgets to indispensable, almost vitally 
important tools in people's lives and their use penetrated almost all of our daily 
life activities (Lee et al., 2014).  
According to the Yearly report of “We Are Social” (2017), an agency specialised 
in social media and digital marketing, about half of the world’s population uses a 
smartphone and about two-thirds of the world’s population has a mobile phone. 
Comparing the data of the Internet use of 2015 and 2016 there is a notable 10% 
increase (354 million users). The number of active social media users and mobile 
social media users raised by 21%, (482 million) and 30% (581 million) 
respectively. People are using much less their personal computers and more and 
more their smartphones on webpages and applications. Facebook is currently the 
most used social network (more than 1.5 billion active users in the world), even 
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though the use of messaging and snapshots applications such as WhatsApp, 
Messenger, Snapchat etc. is increasing exponentially (We Are Social, 2017). 
Italy is following the same trend. From 2015 to 2016 the number of people with 
access to the web increased by 4% (with and overall 66% rate of penetration, i.e. 
39.21 million users) and of those using the social media by 17%. Personal 
computer use decreased by 14% while the use of smartphones increased by 44% 
(We Are Social Italia, 2017). 
Despite the usefulness of digital devices in a wide range of situations and 
domains, their widespread produced several side effects in terms of physical and 
mental health. Several researches found that a prolonged and regular use of a 
smartphone to check missed calls or messages may result in compulsive usage 
and even lead to mobile phone addiction for smartphone users (Bianchi & 
Phillips, 2005; Oulasvirta et al., 2012; Takao, Takahashi, & Kitamura, 2009). In 
their study, Oulasvirta and colleagues (2012) showed, for example, that their 
subjects checked their phones 34 times a day, and in many occasion not for a real 
need but just because it became a rooted habit.  
The compulsive usage may lead to health issues such as sleep disturbances and 
depression (Thomée et al., 2007; Thomée, Härenstam & Hagberg, 2011). The 
overuse of technology is also linked to heightened psychological distress 
(Chesley, 2005). Technostress is the phenomenon of the end users experiencing 
stress due to information and communication overload (Ragu-Nathan, Tarafdar, 
Ragu-Nathan, & Tu, 2008). Medical literature also suggests that the 
electromagnetic radiation of smartphones may affect biological systems by 
altering the antioxidant systems of human tissues, leading to oxidative stress 
(Ozguner et al., 2005). Therefore, compulsive smartphone usage increases the 
user’s stress level for both psychological and physiological reasons. 
Social interactions have been also deeply affected by the spread of digital 
devices. Moreover, the overuse of smartphones in social and recreational 
contexts, has been found to be associated with a reduction in the quality and 
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quantity of social interactions (Geser, 2006). Detoxification from digital devices 
may be thus critical to help individuals improve these aspects of their life.  
The focus of this study is on the last point described above, i.e. the use of 
smartphones in social contexts. It is important to understand that the pervasive 
and dysfunctional use of such devices can be significantly influenced by 
contextual factors. According to Thaler and Sunstein (2008) setting an 
appropriate “choice architecture” may be useful to change dysfunctional 
behaviors without the need to impose economic incentives or bans and 
punishments. The research presents two studies built upon the principles of 
Nudge and focused on reducing the utilisation of smartphones in social contexts, 
and more precisely in two different settings. 
8.2.1. Materials and Method 
Setting 
The intervention took place in one pub located in the centre of Milan, Italy. The 
pub has been chosen based on the availability of the owners to participate in the 
initiative. The pub was serving drinks and offered a buffet throughout the 
evening. 
Participants (Statistical Units) 
The statistical unit (SU) chosen for the data analysis refers to the number of 
people seated on the tables. The SU adapted every time the number of people on 
the observed table changed.  
Ethical approval: All procedures performed in the study were in accordance to 
the ethical standards of the institutional and/or national research committee and 
with the 1964 Helsinki declaration and its later amendments or comparable 
ethical standards. 
Materials 
A wooden basket with stuck on labels with the image of a smartphone and a 
slogan that invited customers to place their devices in (“sei davvero social? 
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#posalo i.e. are you really social? #leaveit”) was placed in the centre of each 
table (see Appendix D1). The boxes had 6 compartments for the smartphones. 
Measures 
Two observers independently assessed the rate of the smartphones use by the 
customers. To gather data each observer was provided with 5 observational grids 
for each phase of the intervention. Both the control and the experimental grids 
provided two blank cells to note the number of people seated on the table and the 
number of people who were interacting with their smartphones. (See Appendix 
D2) A list of the specific behaviors considered as “interactions with the 
smartphone” (see. Table 1) was established in advance.  
Table 1. The table above describes the target behaviors, i.e. the ones that are considered as 
interactions with the smartphone, and the non target behaviors, i.e. those that are not considered 
as interactions. 
Target behaviors Non-target behaviors
The customer holds the smartphone and is looking at it The phone is on the table but nobody is 
interacting with it
The customer holds the smartphone to make a call or to 
send an sms
The phone is held on the legs but the 
customer is not looking at it
The customer touches the smartphone to check 
notifications, time etc.
 
The customer uses the smartphone as a sharing tool, 
with the other participants on the table (in this case the 
behavior is reported twofold: an X for both - the 
customer that is holding the smartphone and for the 
one/s that is/are looking at it.
The customer takes photos or selfies 
(if the subject is making a photo to other customer or a 
selfie with them, the behavior will be reported twofold: 
an X both for the customer that is making the photo and 
for the one/s that is /are having the photo.
The customer holds the phone in his hand without 
looking at it.
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A momentary time sampling (MTS) recording method was used during the 
observations. With the MTS, the observer records whether a behavior occurs or 
does not occur at the end of a presetted time interval. The method was chosen for 
several reasons.  
First, the main target of the experiment were prolonged behaviors (calls, texting, 
check internet, playing games, etc...) although the short ones were also included 
during the observations. In addition, there are many different possible 
interactions with smartphones, we expected to deal with a wide range of 
behaviors. The MTS reliably measures behaviors that are long and/or 
heterogeneous. 
Second, MTS is effective to observe group of individuals. The study aimed to 
observe the widest possible sample of people. We expected to find in a pub a 
heterogeneous clientele and this method seemed to be the most useful to pursue 
the goal.  
Third, MTS is less intrusive compared with other time sampling methods. During 
the experiment, the observers were seated in the pub as customers, so the MTS 
was the best choice to reduce the chance to be noticed and to influence the 
customer’s behavior. 
Finally, MTS is less tiring for the observers compared with other time sampling 
methods in which they have to look at their subjects for a prolonged amount of 
time.  
The MTS is not the best method to observe short behaviors. Although these were 
not the primary target, to reduce this problem to some extent, short intervals of 
time for monitoring were settled in order to increase the number of observations 
and thus the chance to record at least part of the short behaviors. 
Observational grids were used to record the control and the experimental data. 
Procedures 
The pub was observed two times, in the same day of two consecutive weeks, 
from 7.00 PM to 11.00 P.M.  
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Six tables were observed in sequence by two observers in order to evaluate the 
inter-observer agreement. Each table was observed on the count of 5 seconds. 
The observers were provided with headphones to listen to a recorded audio file 
measuring the time and helping them synchronise when to shift their look to the 
next table. Each observation string (i.e. the consecutive observation of the six 
tables) was lasting 30 seconds with a pause of 5 seconds between each 
observational string. Thus, each table was observed with a time latency of 35 
seconds. Each observation grid counted 30 observational strings and the time 
necessary to fill each grid was 17 minutes and 30 seconds.  
The pubs were observed until all 5 observational grids were filled. Tables to 
observe were chosen based on two criteria: 
1. the observed tables had to be clearly visible from the table in which the 
observers were seated; 
2. at least three tables had to be full, i.e. having at least two or more people 
seated on each table 
For each observed table, for each observation (i.e. every 5 sec.) each observer 
had to sign in on the observational grid the number of subjects seated at that 
moment and the number of people that emitted one of the target behaviors 
showed in Table 1. Whenever the observer missed an observation or the visibility 
of one or more tables was not clear to directly look at the subjects, an empty 
space was left in the grid. 
Experimental design 
A between groups plan was implemented, with an independent variable 
(intervention vs. nonintervention) and two independent groups, with repeated 
measure on the dependent variable. The dependent variable was the frequency of 
use of the smartphones. 
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Outcome measures 
Three outcome measures were considered:  
Outcome 1 was the percentage of time in which none of the subjects included in 
a specific SU interacted with their smartphone. 
Outcome 2 was the percentage of time in which every subject included in a 
specific SU interacted with their smartphone. 
Outcome 3 was the maximum consecutive period of time within a SU in which 
none of the people interacted with their smartphone. 
Data analysis 
From the data analysis were excluded the SU that counted less than four 
consecutive observations. Moreover, were excluded from the data analysis those 
observations in which just one person was seated on the table.    
Categorical data are presented as n (%) and continuous data as means (SD), and 
median and interquartile range in case of Non-normal distribution. A 95% 
confidence interval (CI) indicates uncertainty around the estimates. Chi-square 
(Fisher exact test was used when appropriate) was used to evaluate differences 
between categorical variables, whereas Mann-Whitney test was used to 
investigate differences between continuous variables. All analysis were carried 
out with SPSS (version 22.0, SPSS, Inc, Chicago, IL, 2011) P < .05 was 
considered statistically significant for all analyses.      
8.2.2. Results 
Inter-observer agreement (IOA), i.e. the degree to which two or more 
independent observers report the same observation after measuring the same 
event (Cooper, Heron & Heward 2007, p. 213), was calculated during the control 
and the experimental phases for both the number of people seated on the tables 
and for the frequency of use of the smartphone.  
During the control phase the IOA for the number ranged between 96% and 100% 
while the IOA for the frequency ranged between 86% and 97%. 
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During the experimental phase the IOA for the number ranged between 96% and 
100% while the IOA for the frequency ranged between 93% and 100%. 
Overall seventy-four statistical units were observed: forty-seven (63.5%) in the 
control phase and twenty-seven (36.5%) in the experimental phase. 
The SUs ranged between 2 and 4 persons per table. In the control group 29 SUs 
(61.7%) were composed by two people; 9 (19.1%) were composed by 3 people 
and 9 (19.1%) by 4 people; in the experimental group 15 SUs (55.6%) were 
composed by two people; 3 (11.1%) were composed by 3 people and 9 (33.3%) 
by 4 people. There are no differences between the two groups in this distribution 
(Chi-square(2)=2.21; p=0.331). 
The median time spent at the table by people included in each SU was similar in 
the two conditions (U=626.50; p=0.928), and it was respectively 5 minutes and 
15 seconds (interquartile range = 7 minutes and 35 seconds) in the control phase 
and 6 minutes and 25 seconds (interquartile range = 8 minutes and 45 seconds) in 
the experimental phase.  
Effectiveness of the intervention 
Outcome 1: The percentage of time spent by all the subjects without using 
smartphone in each SU was significantly higher (U=454.5; p=.038) in the 
experimental phase (median = 98.5%; interquartile range = 25%) than in the 
control group (median = 75%; interquartile range = 50%). Furthermore, 22 SU 
(46.8%) in the control phase and 19 SU (70.4%) in the experimental one did not 
use their smartphone for 80% of the observations (Figure 21). The likelihood of 
not using smartphone is significantly higher in the experimental group than in the 
control group (Chi-square(1)=3.85; p=.05). 
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               Figure 21. The histograms show the percentage  
           of SU in which smartphones were not used for  
           80% of the observations during the two phases. 
Outcome 2: The percentage of time in which all the subjects in the SU interacted 
with their smartphone was significantly higher (Chi-square(1)=6.64; p=.011) in 
the control group (21.3% (N=10)) than in the experimental group (0%) (Figure 
22). 
 
              Figure 22. The histograms show the percentage 
           of time in which all the subject of a SU interacted 
             with their smartphones during two phases. 
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Outcome 3: Figure 23 shows the overall longest consecutive median time spent 
by the subjects of the SU without any interaction with their smartphone in the 
control and the experimental group. 
The median time in which all the people of one SU did not use their smartphone 
was similar in the two conditions (U=502.00; p=0.393), and it was respectively 3 
minutes and 30 seconds (interquartile range = 6 minutes and 31 seconds) in the 
control phase and 4 minutes and 39 seconds (interquartile range = 8 minutes and 
59 seconds) in the experimental phase.  
 
Figure 23. The overall longest consecutive median time spent by the subjects of the SUs 
without any interaction with their smartphones is represented in the box-plots.  
8.2.3. Discussion 
Three outcome measures were considered in order to evaluate the effectiveness 
of the intervention i.e. the the percentage of time in which none of the subjects 
included in a specific SU interacted with their smartphone (Outcome 1); the 
percentage of time in which every subject included in a specific SU interacted 
with their smartphone (Outcome 2); and the maximum consecutive period of 
time within a SU in which none of the people interacted with their smartphone 
(Outcome 3).  
Results showed that the percentage of time spent by subjects without using 
smartphone in each SU was significantly higher in the experimental phase, 
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compared with the control one (Outcome 1). Moreover, the percentage of time in 
which all the subjects interacted with their smartphone in each SU was 
significantly higher in the control phase compared with the experimental one 
(Outcome 2). Finally, statistically significant differences were not found 
comparing the overall longest consecutive median time spent without interaction 
with their smartphones by the subjects of the SUs in the two conditions 
(Outcome 3). 
The study presents some main limitations. First, the pilot study can rely on a 
fairly small sample of observed SU. More observations must be conducted in 
order to have clearer results. Second, the study took into account the frequency in 
the usage of smartphones. However, no measures were observed about people’s 
interpersonal interactions. It would be useful to assess if the reduction in the 
usage of the smartphones is effectively related to an increase in interpersonal 
communication. Finally, due to privacy issues it has not been possible to make 
video observation which would have been a more precise method to observe all 
possible interactions of the subjects with their smartphones. 
Considering the low cost of the intervention, however, the results seem 
promising and it would be worthy to extend the observations to different cultural 
contexts in order to test their generalisability. Ongoing researches are already 
addressing this point. Moreover, it could be interesting to test the effectiveness of 
the intervention by using just the slogan without the basket.  
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8.3. Less sugar by default: resize the packets of sugar to reduce its 
consumption in a coffee bar 
Abstract  
The present study aimed to reduce the sugar intake among the customers who purchased coffee 
in a coffee shop inside a gym in Catania, Italy. We hypothesised that people would frame their 
choice about the amount of sugar to put in their coffee in units (number of packets) and not in 
amount (grams). Thus, we expected a significant decrease in sugar intake among the customers 
in the experimental phase. The customers of the coffee shop were observed for for two weeks 
(N=213) and just the data about those who put sugar in their coffee were analysed (N=96). 
During both the first (control phase) and the second week (experimental phase), sugar 
consumption was measured. During the experimental phase, however, the packets originally 
used in the coffee shop (7.5g) were replaced with packets that contain less sugar (4g). Results 
supported the hypothesis, showing a significant reduction in the sugar consumption during the 
second week. 
Keyword: sugar; nudge; default; coffee shop  
In 2015, the World Health Organization (WHO) recommended that the intake of 
free sugars should not exceed 10% of the total daily intake of calories . (World 7
Health Organization, 2015). The literature provides evidence that a prolonged 
overconsumption of sugar can increase the chance to develop several health 
issues and diseases such as diabetes, coronary heart disease and obesity (e.g. 
Vecchia, Franceschi, Bidoli, Barbone & Dolara, 1993; Janket, Manson, Sesso, 
Buring & Liu, 2003; Johnson et al., 2009; Lustig, Schmidt & Brindis, 2012; Yang 
et al., 2014). Among the factors that in general influence food consumption, 
packaging and portion sizes have been found to play a significant role (e.g. Rolls, 
Morris & Roe, 2002; Aerts & Smits, 2017; Poelman et al., 2016).  
Despite these evidences worldwide the last 30-40 years have been characterised 
by a general increase in package size of products (e.g. Smiciklas-Wright, 
Mitchell, Mickle, Goldman & Cook, 2003).  
 The WHO did not refer to the sugars contained in fresh vegetables and fruits or those naturally present 7
in milk, because there is no reported evidence of adverse effects of consuming these sugars
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Nudge is a policy program developed by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein 
starting from the principles of BE in order to help people to act in a way that is 
more functional with their goals (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008) without using 
punishments or bans. That is achieved by working on the environment in which 
people act and take decisions.The literature about Nudge shows that one of the 
most effective strategy to promote desirable behaviors is the use of the default 
option (e.g. Johnson & Goldstein, 2004; Thaler & Benartzi, 2004). Setting a 
default option means setting an option that will be automatically chosen unless 
people actively choose to behave in an different way. Many examples can be 
listed. Smartphones and digital device are sold with predefined setting that 
people can eventually change. Many subscriptions get automatically renewed 
unless the customer actively decides to unsubscribe. According to Sunstein, 
however, the default rule should be the one that is in line with people's 
preferences in order to be considered as a Nudge.  
The present study aimed to reduce the intake of sugar in a coffee shop working 
on offering reduced amount sugar in the package. We assumed that people frame 
their choice about the amount of sugar to put in their coffee in units, (number of 
packets) rather than considering the effective amount (grams) contained in the 
packets. It has been hypothesised that by replacing the original packets of sugar 
with ones that contains a smaller amount of it, would have reduced the average of 
sugar intake per person. 
8.3.1. Materials and Method 
Setting 
The intervention took place in a gym in Catania, Italy.  
Participants were the self-selected customers of the gym’s coffee shop. The data 
was collected for twelve days (from Monday to Saturday), between 3pm and 
4pm. 
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Ethical approval: All procedures performed in the study were in accordance to 
the ethical standards of the institutional and/or national research committee and 
with the 1964 Helsinki declaration and its later amendments or comparable 
ethical standards. 
Materials 
Packets with 7,5g of sugar were used during the control phase, replaced with 4g 
packets during the experimental one.  
Measures 
An observational grid was used in order to note how many packets of sugar each 
client was pouring in their drinks (see Figure 1) 
Procedure 
The experimenter observed just the customers who purchased coffee. After the 
client's finished to drink it, the experimenter take note of the number of packets 
used. Four possible source of data were recorded: 
1. When people did not use any sugar, a 0 was noted on the grid; 
2. When one or more packets were empty the number of used packets were 
noted on the grid; 
3. When the packet was not empty, it was arbitrary choose to consider it as 
half full packet; 
4. When were used a certain number of packets plus a part of another, it was 
noted the number of packet plus half. 
For the data analysis, were considered just the clients who used brown or white 
sugar, while were excluded those who used other kinds of sweeteners were 
excluded.  
Outcome measure 
The average of grams consumed per person among the customers who put sugar 
in their coffee was the outcome measure of the experiment. In order to do it, 
packets have been converted in grams. 
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8.3.2. Results 
During the control phase 102 customers were observed; among them 52 (51%) 
put sugar in their coffee while 50 (49%) did not. During the experimental phase 
111 customers were observed; among them, 44 (40%) put sugar in their coffee 
while 67 (60%) did not;  
To evaluate the amount of sugar consumed in the two phases an independent t-
test was performed excluding participants who did not put any sugar in the 
coffee. The average intake of sugar per person was 5.91g (SD=1.87) during the 
control observation, reducing to 3.05g (SD=1.01) during the experimental one 
(see Figure 24). The difference between the average of sugar consumed during 
the control phase and the experimental one was statistically significant 
(t(94)=9.10; p<0.001; Cohen’s D=1.37).  
 
         Figure 24. The histograms show the average grams  
         of sugar consumed by the customers of the coffee  
         shop who put sugar in their coffee. 
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8.3.3. Discussion 
The results confirmed the initial hypothesis, showing a significant reduction in 
the average of sugar intake during the experimental phase. The study seems to 
support the effectiveness of manipulating the default rule when facing with 
unhealthy behaviors that are assumed to be “mindless”. Results seems to be in 
line with the idea that customers, when choosing the amount of sugar base their 
choice on units instead of on  real amount. Further experiments could assess the 
generalisability of this finding in other cultural contexts and with different kind 
of goods. 
The intervention has some main limitations. First, due to the experimental 
design, it is not possible to exclude that some of the clients were regular 
customers and so, present in both the control and the experimental condition. 
Second, the choice to consider as half the non-empty packets of sugar was 
arbitrary. However, the same measurement was kept in both conditions. In further 
studies  it could be useful to measure the non-empty packets in order to have 
more precise data.  
Conflict of Interests: The authors declare that they have no conflict of interests.  
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Introduction 
In the literature different authors claim that BE should be seen as an application 
of cognitive science in the realm of economic decision-making (e.g. Angner & 
Loewenstein, 2007, Heukelom, 2007) and some of them go further claiming that 
BE should have been called more properly cognitive economics (Angner & 
Loewenstein, 2007). 
In the first part of the PhD thesis it has been traced the historical and theoretical 
frame of BE providing information about the intellectual background that led to 
its emergence and development. In Part 2 it has been made an account of the 
main policy programs rooted in BE principles. Part 3 described the research 
projects carried out by the author of this thesis during the last three years. The 
next part is proposed as an attempt to understand some notions of BE and its best 
known applied approach (Nudge) based on the principles of BA. 
Part 4: An overview. This part of the PhD thesis provides a historical and 
theoretical frame of Behaviorism, with a particular focus on the functional 
contextualist approach called “Behavioral Analysis” (BA), whose main exponent 
was Frederick B. Skinner (1904-1990). BA is rarely mentioned when talking 
about BE and Nudge. The focus here is on common and divergent points between 
BE, Nudge and BA. 
The place of part 4 at the end of the PhD thesis, after the research presented in 
Part 3 has been chosen for an important reason. BE and Nudge led to a wide 
range of interventions that showed their effectiveness and helped greatly to build 
up knowledge about decision making and choice. Therefore, after having in mind 
the traditional perspective building on the concepts of BA can broaden and 
expand the understanding of human behavior and choices. Moreover, as in every 
relatively new discipline much can still be done but it is important to give a credit 
to the work of researchers and experts like Kahneman, Tversky, Thaler, Sunstein 
and Gigerenzer who built its foundations. Their framework has been often 
sharply criticised without offering effective alternatives neither of their 
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theoretical nor of their applicational standpoint. However, no absolute truths are 
provided, this part only sets the basis of a multidisciplinary dialogue that could 
further improve the knowledge about decision making and choices that are 
constant part of daily life. It is a small contribution to the scientific approach to 
the study of human decisions without breaking up with the valuable findings in 
the research until now. 
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9. Pepper’s World Hypotheses 
The differences in the different approaches of psychology depends on the level of 
analysis chosen, the unit of analysis taken into account and the experimental 
procedures adopted. Based on these elements, each approach elaborates 
observations and inferences that are organised in an interpretative model. In other 
words, the world around us is “seen”, analysed, described and interpreted 
differently according to what one chooses as the basic element for observation 
(Moderato & Copelli 2012, p. 10). The epistemological premise from which the 
this part of the PhD thesis will start is the one adopted by Skinner and by the 
modern behavioral approaches, that is called “functional contextualism”.  
In order to have a better understanding of Skinner’s theoretical framework and its 
developments, it is useful to start from the work of the physiologist Stephen C. 
Pepper (1891-1972). In 1942 Pepper published his book “World Hypothesis: A 
Study in Evidence”. The author postulated the existence of a few philosophical 
models, defined as “world visions” or “world hypothesis” . Those were 8
“hypotheses” about how the world works and the scientists, therefore, must 
observe carefully and must try to understand. From such a starting point it is 
possible to build knowledge (Pepper, 1942). Looking at reality without 
preconception or “lenses” it is impossible to reach valid conclusions and would 
not allow any progress in knowledge. In the best case it would only give rise to a 
set of perceptual experiences that the observer would not be able to interpret. The 
aftermath, unfortunately, is that each of the “world’s views” is unavoidably 
partial. Thus, the “world hypothesis” differs in scope (the amount of events that 
they can explain) and precision (the shortage of alternative explanations 
formulated for embedded events). Because scope and precision are inversely 
related, no “world view” can fully meet both criteria: unavoidably it is possible to 
gain in precision at the expense of scope, and vice versa (Hayes, Hayes & Reese, 
1988). 
 The two terms will be used interchangeably8
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Another peculiarity of the world's visions is that they are independent and 
alternative to each other. They can be compared but not put in competition with 
each other. According to Pepper’s theorisation, this assumption has some relevant 
implications: First, it is unjust and useless to criticise a “world view” using the 
principles of another ”world view”. Second, the validity of a “world view” should 
not be claimed by highlighting the fallacies of another one. Finally, eclecticism is 
not admitted as an option, because combining different visions of the world 
would be a source of confusion. Pepper’s “world visions” can be represented by 
four “root metaphors”, i.e. mechanism, formism, organicism, and contextualism, 
useful to conceptualise and organise reality into a coherent system of categories 
(Pepper, 1942; Moderato & Ziino, 1995; Anchisi, Moderato & Pergolizzi, 2016).  
Mechanism. The “root metaphor” of mechanism is the machine made up by 
discrete parts that are systematically connected. The relations between the 
different parts does not change their nature, since they exist independently of their 
relation. Moreover, as in any machine, some kind of energy must be inputted into 
the system in order to obtain predictable results. According to this vision of the 
world, the whole universe is like a big machine. 
The mechanist aims to find out what parts compose reality and what are their 
relations. Assuming that the parts fit each other in a precise order, Pepper tries to 
discover the true nature of an event by identifying what kind of part it is and its 
exact location in the general system, i.e. the machine. This goal is pursued based 
on a theoretical model built upon the observed facts. However, the 
correspondence between the theoretical model and the facts from which the 
model was built can not be used as proof of the suitability of the model itself. The 
same fact can not be used either to build a model or to confirm it. Thus, the 
validity of the model is verified by comparing it with a variety of facts implied by 
the model itself, using a hypothetic-deductive method. The more derivative and 
indirect are the predictions, the greater the power to confirm them (Hayes, Hayes 
& Reese, 1988; Anchisi, Moderato & Pergolizzi 2010, p. 108) . 
Formism. The “root metaphor” of formism is similarity or in other words the 
recurrence of recognisable forms. Formists do not assume that facts are organised 
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in a systematic way, and therefore they do not need to hypothesise about any kind 
of “force” in order explain them. If facts would need to be integrated by a set of 
formistic principles, then they would necessarily form a system, and formism 
would begin to mix with some characteristics of mechanism. Causality in this 
vision is nothing but a link between sets of details. In other words it is the form 
that explains the facts. As in mechanism, in formism the truth criterion is 
correspondence, but in this case the simplest explanation has to be the most 
appropriate (Hayes, Hayes & Reese, 1988). 
Organicism. The “root metaphor” of organicism is the process of organic 
development, as in the case of living systems. In such systems change is assumed 
while stability has to be explained. A good example are models of development in 
stages according to which individuals are expected to move from one stage to the 
next one in a certain sequence and in a predictable way. To explain a stage of 
development of a person it is necessary to explain which rules govern the change. 
For the organicists the whole is not a sum of the parts. Conversely, the whole is 
the basic unit and the parts are meaningless unless they are taken in its context. 
The truth criterion in organicism is coherence. When a network of related facts 
leads to a conclusion, it is the coherence of that network of facts that makes the 
conclusion “true”. Any contradictions in the understanding come from an 
incomplete knowledge of the whole organic process (Hayes, Hayes & Reese, 
1988). 
Contextualism. The “root metaphor” of contextualism is the ongoing act in 
context. That means that an event takes its meaning only in the light of its current 
and historical context: the subject of study is the act in its context. Within this 
perspective, the concept of similarity between events based on their formal 
properties loses its meaning. What makes similar some events can only be their 
relation to the context, i.e. their function. That means that the events are 
considered as belonging to the same class if they have the same consequences. 
Thus the concept of similarity in the form is replaced by similarity in the function. 
In other words, two events belong to the same class if they share the same 
function, while events similar in their form may belong to a different function. 
127
Behavioral Economics and Behavioral Change Policies
For example a man sitting in silence in a waiting room and another one shouting, 
although their behavior is of different kind it may belong to the same class of 
events, for example “to gather attention”. Conversely, two men may be both 
sitting in silence, but one could be trying to gather attention and the other one to 
isolate himself. In this example, the form of their behaviors is identical although 
the function is completely different. Moreover, within this perspective, the 
distinction between the act and its context is of great importance. In fact, the same 
event can be considered an act or a context depending on the researcher's interest 
and this can lead to an infinitive regression.  
However, in its analysis contextualism adopts a pragmatic truth criterion so that 
the analysis is deemed “true” if it includes enough features of the context to 
achieve successfully the goal of the analysis. It is important to note that 
contextualism does not specify anything about the value of the goals themselves, 
which are formulated by the researcher and taken as starting assumptions (Hayes, 
Hayes & Reese, 1988).  
The Two Souls of Behaviorism. Although Pepper’s book was not written for 
psychologists or scientists, different psychological approaches often seem to have 
the characteristics of one or another of the four “world views”. As it is seen in the 
next sections the term “behaviorism” refers to different approaches that are 
different both at an epistemological and theoretical level. It may be said 
metaphorically that behaviorism showed, in its history, “two souls” that fit with 
different “world views”. The first one is mechanistic and it characterised the first 
behaviorism of Watson. The other one, is contextualist and it is the one adopted in 
what is called “Behavioral Analysis” (Anchisi, Moderato & Pergolizzi 2016, p.
111). 
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10. Behaviorism: Historical Backdrop and Theoretical Framework 
Wilhelm M. Wundt (1832-1920) was a German physician, physiologist, 
philosopher and professor. He is universally considered one of the founding 
figures of modern psychology and the foundation of his Laboratory in Lipsia 
(1879) is considered the beginning of experimental psychology. In 1913, the year 
of publication of Watson's Behaviorist Manifesto (Watson, 1913), however, 
experimental psychology was more in the minds of the psychologists than a 
reality. 
Wundt certainly gave a fundamental impulse to the development of psychology. 
However, his attempt had little to do with experimentation and a scientific 
approach in the study of human psychology still was needed to be built. Wundt’s 
main contribution was that he began to deal with the mind-body debate in a 
scientific way and no longer just philosophically. He focused his studies on the 
contents of consciousness using the method of introspection, by which, an 
adequately trained individual, exposed to particular stimuli, described his 
experiences. The structuralism of Wundt and his American student Titchener was 
a system characterised by staticity and insensitivity to the phenomena of 
adaptation. However, this idea was poorly suited to the pragmatic spirit of 
American society (Anchisi, Moderato & Pergolizzi 2016, p. 103). 
Functionalism was a more dynamic concept and in line with the spirit of the time 
that found greater consensus in America. It emerged as a valid alternative to 
structuralism. The starting point for this school of thought was considering 
psychological processes as psychological functions with an adaptive value for the 
body. That was in greater harmony with Charles Darwin's theory and Herbert 
Spencer's studies. Great importance was in fact attributed to concepts like 
evolution, adaptation, environment, function, which are fundamental to 
understand the roots of modern behaviorism. It is within this cultural background 
characterised by the debate between structuralism and functionalism in which the 
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behavioral revolution emerged and flourished. (Anchisi, Moderato & Pergolizzi 
2017, p. 103) 
In 1913 Watson published his article “Psychology as the Behaviorist Views 
it” (Watson, 1913). For a young science like psychology the natural and almost 
mandatory choice was following the path of other natural (organic and inorganic) 
sciences of the 19th and 20th centuries. Following this vision, the focus in 
psychology had to be the behavior of organisms instead of the expression of 
invisible processes like thoughts and emotions. The method to use in order to 
study behavior had to be the same used by natural sciences. The laboratory 
became the place where the researcher could have control of the environment and 
thus could simplify reality by dealing with “simple” stimuli.  
The task of Watson was difficult and ungrateful. Considering the extreme 
complexity of human behavior and the limited tools available at the time, the best 
way he found in order to carry on his research was to simplify as much as 
possible the subject of his studies. Behaviorism, therefore, represented a 
revolutionary opportunity for the progress of psychology. On one hand, it 
allowed psychology to definitively stick out from an animistic conception. On 
the other it contributed substantially to the constitution of the epistemological 
state of scientific psychology. By using a scientific approach it got detached from 
the method of philosophical speculation to deal with problems and events of the 
real world (Anchisi, Moderato & Pergolizzi 2017, p. 102). Watson defines its 
subject and method of psychology in his Manifesto (1913) in the following way:  
“Psychology as the behaviorist, views it, is a purely objective experimental branch of 
natural science. Its theoretical goal is the prediction and control of behavior.”  
(Watson, 1913) 
The tools of behavioral psychology became direct observation, experimentation, 
analysis and non-prejudicial interpretation of events, observed as they occur and 
modified by specific circumstances. For this reason the behavioral paradigm has 
been for long time the basis of research in modern psychology. 
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10.1. Watson Mechanistic View of Behavior  
Mechanism characterised the Stimulus-Response (S-R) model of Watson 
(Harzem, 1995). The S-R model excluded any subjective variables from the 
scientific investigation and replaced them with a black box that did not satisfy 
those who perceived it as central to the understanding of human variables that 
were not directly observable such as emotions and thoughts. In other words, all 
the humans’ private events were excluded by the analysis. 
In Watson’s paradigm, as described above (Part 4, section 9) by talking about the 
mechanistic root metaphor, the “human behavior machine” is made up of a chain 
of connections that are directly and effectively linked. The chain is represented 
by a series of causes and effects. The changes that occur in these causes and their 
related effects are perfectly predictable. Environment represents a reduction of 
the stimuli, and responses represent a reduction of behaviors.  
10.1.1. Limits and Criticism 
The first phase of behaviorism, from the beginning of ‘900 until the second 
world war, consisted predominantly of an ideological display against the 
previous Wundtian psychology that was based on psychic factors. Two positions 
can be distinguished from this. Watson (1924, p.14) declared behavior as an 
object of study of psychology and defined it through its form. According to him 
behavior included muscle movements and glandular secretion. From this 
perspective, which Hayes (2005) defines metaphysical behaviorism, all the 
activities of the organisms could be reduced to events of this type; and even if 
mental activities or other activities that did not involve pure movement existed, 
these could not be the object of study of a scientific psychology because the 
public agreement on how they occurred was impossible (Hayes defines this 
second position methodological behaviorism). Both metaphysical and 
methodological behaviorism were characterised by a reductionist approach, 
excluding every subjective variable from the scientific investigation replacing it 
with a black box. This position did not satisfy those who conceived as central the 
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understanding of  human behavior variables that are not directly observable, as 
emotions and thoughts.  
Starting from the second half of the 20th century, scientific psychology began to 
get interested in the study of private experiences that J. B. Watson locked in the 
untouchable black box. 
On one hand risen the current of  the cognitivists, sharply criticising behaviorism 
and explicitly focusing their interest in the study of private experiences as the 
causes of behaviors. Covert behaviors bursted into the psychological landscape 
becoming an object of studies. Irrational thoughts and beliefs were identified and 
modified in order to change the overt behavior of the person and many aspects of 
human functioning were described through internal entities (personalities, mental 
schemes, associations, attachment styles) that more or less explicitly assumed a 
causal function. 
On the other hand, behaviorism experienced some evolution. Collaterally to the 
metaphysical and methodological currents two other approaches developed: 
Kantor’s interbehaviorism and Skinner's BA (Anchisi, Moderato & Pergolizzi 
2017, p. 106). The study of private events got the main challenge in BA and that 
is particularly clear in Skinner book Verbal Behavior (1957). The author clearly 
stated to the examining thoughts, emotions and sensations, though this important 
fact went unnoticed by the scientific community: 
A science of behavior must consider the place of private stimuli as physical things, and in doing 
so it provides an alternative account of mental life. The question, then, is this: What is inside the 
skin, and how do we know about it? The answer is, I believe, the heart of radical behaviorism. 
(Skinner 1974, pp. 211–212) 
10.2. From Watson to Skinner: A Contextualist Approach in the Study of 
Human Behavior 
According to many authors (e.g. Hayes & Brownstein, 1986; Moderato & Chase, 
1995; Morris, 1988), an example of a contextual approach within psychology is 
that of BA, the science that has developed thanks to the researches and the 
theoretical writings of the most influential behavioral psychologist of the 20th 
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century, Burrhus F. Skinner. BA is contextual, because its study is focused on the 
ongoing behavior in its context and because it describes the properties of the 
relation between the organism and the environment.  
Moreover BA is rooted in the functionalist philosophical tradition, which origins 
can be attributed to the Aristotelian naturalism. This implies that all the 
explanations that accompany what is observed must be given in terms of other 
observable elements of the same type. Thus it is necessary to remain within the 
“circle” of the experience and phenomena without taking into account 
transcendent entities or supernatural forces (Anchisi, Moderato & Pergolizzi 
2016, p. 112). 
Prediction and Control. The goals pursued in BA are two: prediction and control 
(Skinner, 1953). The former is achieved by describing the changes in the 
dependent variables as a result of the changes in the independent ones. The latter 
is achieved by manipulating the independent variables. Therefore, they are 
identified on the basis of two features: they must allow both predictive and 
manipulative action. Events that allow to achieve just one or the other aspect can 
not be accepted in an experimental BA. 
Truth Criterion. According to Pepper, what saves the contextualists from falling 
into an infinite cycle of component analysis is the criterion of adequacy of the 
analysis (Pepper, 1942). That is, the analysis is "true" only if it is useful to pursue 
a certain kind of outcome or objective, defined beforehand. As Skinner stated:  
“It is true that we can trace human behavior not only to the physical conditions that 
shape and maintain it, but also to the causes of those conditions and the causes of those 
causes, almost infinitely, but we need to conduct the analysis only to the point where, 
effective action can be taken”  
(Skinner, 1974, p.210).  
This point, according to Skinner is represented by the manipulable environment 
(Hayes, Hayes & Reese, 1988), because it is only at this level that the 
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achievement of the analytical behavioral prediction can be evaluated and the 
objectives controlled (Hayes & Brownstein 1986). 
10.2.1. The Subject of Study in Behavioral Analysis 
Behavior can be defined as the activity of the living organisms. Human 
“behavior” is represented by all that people do, how do they move and what do 
they say, think and feel. It can be said that for living organisms, including human 
beings, it is impossible not to behave. 
The term “behavior” in psychology has been the subject of many 
misunderstandings. One of them is to reduce the meaning of behavior to just 
actions and physical body movements. Another one is to counterpose cognition 
and behavior. Cognition is a part that characterises behavior. Another one, dating 
back to Watson, is to accept observable behavior as the only subject of the 
studies in psychology, excluding everything else (Moderato & Copelli 2010, pp. 
21-22). 
On the contrary, BA openly states its aim to study also private events or events 
under the skin and which can not be directly observed, such as for example, 
cognitive processes and emotions (Skinner, 1974).  
Mentalistic elements have been often excluded from the analysis of behavior not 
because are denied or out of the focus of the analysis itself, but just due to the 
impossibility to manipulate them directly, and therefore unnecessary to pursue 
the goal to control behavior described in the previous section (Skinner 1953, p. 
34).  
As stated by Skinner:  
“Explaining behaviors using mental states, just move(s) the focus out of the research of 
(an explanation of) the behaviors. (To) Rely upon an “inner person” means to give an 
explanation (of) to something that could not be explained (itself and its just a way to 
explain things that we are not able to explain) in other ways”.  
(Skinner 1974, p. 165) 
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Paradoxically, it may be said that BA shows little interest for behavior itself. 
Knowing that a person is overeating is not useful by itself (Moderato & Copelli 
2010, p. 20-21). What is important in the analysis of behavior, is to understand in 
which conditions such behavior take place. In other words, BA is focusing on 
functional relations of some classes of variables. For example, in some cases 
overeating may be linked to the search for attention, in other cases to the fact that 
the person is involved in social contexts in which many people are overeating, in 
other cases to physiological dysfunctions, and so on. Thus, it is not the form of 
the behavior that matters for a behavior analyst in order to promote or reduce 
certain behavior, but its function. 
Functional Relations. BA subject of study is a functional relation, technically 
called contingency, made up of three interrelated elements that take place in a 
specific context: a class of stimuli/events that precede the response/behavior 
(antecedents), a class of responses/behaviors and a class of stimuli/events that 
follow the response/behavior (consequences). The explanation of behavior must 
be described in probabilistic/functional and not in deterministic/causal terms. 
Functional means that BA does not focus its studies on structures, but on 
psychological functions, i.e. the process that rise from the interaction between an 
individual and the environment, that can be seen as a unit tied in a reciprocal 
relation (Moderato & Copelli 2010, p.17). 
Historical Dimension of Behavior. Another important aspect in BA is the 
historical dimension of behavior on a psychological and biological level. The 
history of a subject is the series of events that made the person be who he/she is 
in the present. It is crucial for understanding people's behavior and predicting 
how they may probably act in the future and setting BC interventions (Moderato 
& Copelli 2010, p.21). 
10.2.2. A Functional Contextualist Model of Human Behavior 
Stimulus. Every organism lives in an environment and is constantly a subject to 
forces that act upon it. A stimulus (S) or event represents a perceptible change in 
135
Behavioral Economics and Behavioral Change Policies
the environment for the organism. Any environmental variation that results in a 
nervous activity in the body may be a stimulus, whether such activity consists in 
a reflexive response element or is concretised in a reaction it manifests in one or 
more behavioral responses. A stimulus therefore can be defined as a physical, 
organic or social event that can be studied directly or by using appropriate tools. 
Not all stimuli that reach the surface of the body produce effects on the 
individual’s behavior. In other words, not all stimuli have a stimulus function: the 
stimulus function is the description of a specific action that a part of the 
environment has on a particular individual. The function of a stimulus may 
depend on its natural features or on its history of interactions with an organism: 
in other words, the stimulus function can be predisposed genetically or as in 
majority of the cases for humans, it can be acquired.  
The main consequence of the fact that many stimulus functions are acquired is 
that the same stimulus can assume and perform different functions for different 
individuals. On the other side, different stimuli can play the same function for 
multiple individuals (Moderato & Copelli 2010, p. 23). 
While the definition of the stimulus function can only take place on an individual 
basis, many stimulus functions have been studied experimentally and grouped by 
functional classes, i.e. eliciting, discriminative, reinforcing and punishing. A 
stimulus or an event has an eliciting function when it automatically produces 
certain responses or behaviors (R). That’s the case of Pavlovian classical 
conditioning (Pavlov, 1927 ) where, for example, the food (S) elicits 
automatically salivation (R) in the dog. A stimulus or event have a discriminative 
(SD) function when it “sets the occasion” a for behavior. It is important to 
highlight that in this case, according to BA, the stimulus preceded the behavior 
but does not cause it. A stimulus or event have a reinforcing function (SR) when 
they increase the likelihood of the behavior to occur again in the presence of the 
SD. Finally a stimulus or event have a punishing function when they decrease the 
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likelihood of the behavior to occur again in the presence of the SD (Moderato & 
Copelli 2010, p. 24). 
Response. A stimulus in a contextual perspective cannot be defined alone, but it 
is always interdependent to the response. The term “response” refers to the action 
that “responds” to an earlier event, precisely to the stimulus. If you stop here the 
term could be misleading and easily criticised. BA refers to a class of responses 
that share the same function.The term stimuli, Not all the responses of an 
individual organism affect psychology: BA is interested only on those that 
represent behaviors, that is, they constitute the interaction between individuals’ 
actions with the environment. Also responses can be classified. In this case two 
major classes have been described: elicited responses and the emitted behaviors: 
The elicited responses are involuntary reactions that automatically happen when 
a stimulus is presented: in the case of Pavlov’s classical conditioning, the dog’s 
salivation (R) is elicited when a stimulus (S), the meat, is presented.  
Emitted behaviors, on the contrary, are not the causal effect of a specific 
environmental stimulus, and their genesis has to be found in the history of 
subject's interactions with the physical and social environment. This determines 
the fact that in some situations, certain emitted behaviors are more likely and 
frequent than in others. These responses, which may vary widely in complexity, 
cover the full range of human manifestations and represent the way an organism 
acts on and modifies the environment in a more or less adaptive way. The more 
or less adaptive judgment derives from the fact that humans are typically free to 
emit behaviors that are harmful for the environment or their society (polluting the 
environment, destroying habitat) or for themselves (addictions, obesity, risk 
behaviors) and their consequences can be seen often just in the long run 
(Moderato & Copelli 2010, pp. 24-25).  
As for the stimuli, the elements of a class of responses in no way depends on the 
formal characteristics of the behavior involved. Responses belong to the same 
functional class as the result of their common contextual consequences: 
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“Consequences define properties over which responses are said to be 
similar” (Skinner 1953, p. 65); This type of classification corresponds to what 
Pepper wrote (Pepper 1942, p. 255) about the concept of contextual similarity, 
derived from the “convergence of action in a single effect”. 
10.2.2.1. Three Term Contingencies Model 
The most important implication of Skinner’s theorisation of behavior, is that the 
relation between discriminative stimulus (SD) and response (R) depends to the 
consequences (SR) produced by the act itself. In other words, the probability of 
emission of a certain response, depends on the consequences that were present 
previously in the occurrence of a certain discriminative stimulus. Behavior than 
is the dependent variable, and researchers can act upon contextual stimuli in 
order to produce changes in the behavior.  
Based on these principles Skinner developed the three-term contingency model 
or ABC model that can be formally described as follows by Skinner (1953):  
SD (or Antecedents) → R (or Behaviors) → SR (or Consequences)  
10.2.2.2. Four Term Contingency Model  
Many behavior analysts have proposed a “4th” term in addition to the ones 
included in the three-term contingency model, citing the importance of 
motivation in analysing human behavior. In fact, there is another important 
factors that influence the relation between organisms and stimulus. These are 
situational or contextual events.  
Each organism’s stimulation relation takes place in a context that is characterised 
by events that are specific or typical for a particular situation. The context 
influences the interactions, increasing or decreasing the strength, value, and 
characteristics of particular functions of the stimulus and the response produced 
in that interaction. Several examples can be given, ranging from biological to 
social. The state of deprivation of a body or the state of alteration due to alcohol, 
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drugs, medicines and so on can be conceptualised in contextual or situational 
terms (Moderato & Copelli 2010, pp. 25-26).  
Skinner adopted originally the term “drive” in order to define motivation, 
describing it not as an internal variable, but as an environmental one. For 
example, deprivation of food, may increase the hunger, and so having an effect 
on the behavior. (Skinner 1938, p. 350) 
In 1950, Keller and Schoenfeld (Keller & Schoenfeld, 1950) take back the notion 
of drive, developing the notion of Establishing Operation (EO) to define the 
relation between environmental variables and changes in certain behaviors. The 
term EO included all those variables that increase the effectiveness of certain 
consequences. However, many motivational variables decrease the effectiveness 
of consequences so that’s how the term abolishing operation (AO) was named 
(Michael, 1982). Later on, has been proposed the term “Motivating 
Operations,” (MO’s), a broader term that includes both EO and AO to describe 
“any environmental variable that alters the current reinforcing effectiveness of a 
stimulus, object, or event, and alters the frequency of behavior that has been 
reinforced by the same stimulus, object, or event” (Michael, 1988) 
MOs and SD share some points but don’t overlap. Both the SD and MO are 
antecedents of behavior. However, the SD is referred to the availability of a 
certain reinforcer, to the possibility to have access to it by behaving in a certain 
way, while the MO is referred to the value of the reinforcer and to how in a 
certain moment the reinforcer has a reinforcing function. For example, people 
may have learned that when there is a green light on a coffee vending machine, if 
they insert their coin and push the right button they will probably have their 
coffee. So the green light is the SD for having their drink. However, the strength/
value of the reinforcer will increase if a person is thirsty (EO) and decrease if the 
person just drank (AO). 
Nowadays, many BA practitioners consider MO’s to be antecedent stimuli that 
evokes behavior formally describing the four-term contingency as follows:  
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MO/SD→ R → SR (see also Figure 25). 
That’s of fundamental importance while talking about Nudge, because the 
discipline works mostly on the antecedents of a behavior (MO and/or SD).  
 
Figure 25. The four-terms contingency model  
10.2.3. Verbal Behavior 
Skinner's studies on human behavior were not limited to the analysis of overt 
behaviors, but have been extended to the study of private events and complex 
behavioral abilities, such language, emotions and cognitive skills. Verbal 
behaviors in BA are studied in the same way like any other behavior that people 
emit. Skinner and behavioral analysts assume that is possible to treat private 
events using the same tools developed to change “physical” behaviors, that is 
working on antecedents and consequences in order to promote BC. 
So the study of verbal behavior can be seen as an extension to Skinner’s 
paradigm of human behavior and not as a separate domain of studies. Starting 
from his work on verbal behavior (Skinner, 1957) the analysis of the verbal 
context emerged as a privileged subject of study for behavioral scientists.  
Within BA there has long been a distinction between contingency-shaped 
behavior and rule-governed behavior. Contingency-shaped behavior is 
represented by those behavior that has been established by a gradual shaping of 
successive approximations, such as learning to catch a ball by trial and error or 
by a direct contact with the consequences of a certain behavior (Hayes, Strosahl 
140
Behavioral Economics and Behavioral Change Policies
& Wilson 1999, p.28). That means that those behaviors that have reinforcing 
consequences will increase in their probability to be emitted in the future. Those 
that are punished or extinguished will decrease. Taking back the example of the 
vending machine, if the person that inserts the coin and pushes the button 
receives his drink, the chance that in the future he will repeat the same behavior, 
when he is thirsty, will increase (reinforcing consequence). If the machine takes 
the money without releasing any drinks, the chance that he will repeat the same 
behavior in the future will decrease (punishment). Similarly, if the machine gives 
back to the person the coin but does not release any product, the chance that the 
behavior is be repeated will decrease (extinction).  
Many kinds of behavior are acquired this way, but many others are based on 
verbal formulations of events and the relations between them (Hayes, Strosahl & 
Wilson 1999, p.28). It turns out that when behavior is controlled by verbal rules 
tends to be relatively insensitive to changes in the environment (Törneke, 
Luciano & Valdivia Salas, 2008).  
Rule Governed Behavior. In 1966, the concept of rule-governed behavior (RGB) 
was used by Skinner for the first time (Skinner, 1966). RGB has been defined as 
a behavior that occurs by contacting rules that describe contingencies, without a 
contacting the contingencies the rule describes (Skinner, 1969). For example, a 
personal trainer may give to his client the instruction “run half an hour per day 
and you will get in a good shape” and the client may follow the instruction 
without further contingencies. 
RGB have been and are fundamental for the existence and maintenance of human 
species, because allow humans to have effective responses to a wide range of 
situations, without the need to directly contact contingencies that may be 
dangerous or ineffective for surviving or achieving certain goals. (Skinner 1974)  
10.2.4. Limits and Criticisms 
Novelty. Many important processes, such as reasoning, language acquisition, 
learning of arbitrary relational concepts and in general those that can be defined 
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as symbolic activities, have the characteristics of novelty (Anchisi, Moderato & 
Pergolizzi, 2017 p.332).   
Probably on of the main criticisms of BA was the lack of a framework useful to 
explain comprehensively the complexity of language acquisition, based on 
operant and respondent learning. One of the problems with Verbal Behavior 
(1957), as Chomsky highlighted (Chomsky, 1959), was that it failed to take into 
account how new linguistic statements, that have not been reinforced previously, 
can be produced, explaining the high generative nature of human language. Even 
though Skinner’s book did not leave the issue completely untouched, it did not 
provide a clear and convincing account of the almost infinitive novelty that 
language can generate (Shahan & Chase, 2002). Moreover, the topic was 
addressed by Skinner just theoretically, lacking empirical data to support his 
arguments. It is just decades later, in the early ‘70s, thanks to Sidman’s 
experiments on equivalence class formation (Sidman & Tailby, 1982) that 
behavioral scientists dig deeper into the phenomenon addressing it in a more 
comprehensive way and providing evidences about the processes that lie in the 
base of language generativity. 
Listener. Another relevant issue in BA has been the one related with the listener 
behavior.  An important aspect of verbal behavior is that when it occurs, there is 
always a speaker and a listener. However, Skinner restricted the concept of verbal 
behavior to the speaker. Skinner did not a find reason to dig deeper in the 
analysis of the listener’s verbal behavior (Skinner, 1957). Although the listener 
could, of course, also speak, producing a verbal behavior, the listening itself was 
something Skinner mostly left out of his analysis (Schlinger, 2008), so ignoring 
important issues such as meaning, understanding and reference. 
In many situation, understanding the listener behavior is fundamental to explain 
how people can act in the future based on rules that are given in the present. 
Moreover, in many situations it seems that people do not to need to have had 
experienced previously certain consequences in order to follow verbal rules that 
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are given. How a verbal behavior now can specify behavior and consequences 
that will take place in the future and which the individual has not experienced 
earlier? On this extent Skinner’s theorisation lacked a clear explanation.  
Skinner answered this question by referring to “a long history of verbal 
conditioning” (Skinner, 1957, p. 360), but he never pinpointed how to describe 
such a potential learning history. A fundamental principle of how both 
antecedents and consequences acquire their governing functions for behavior is 
that they are contingent on the behavior they influence. Experimental Behavior 
Analysis sees the direct contiguity between stimuli as absolutely crucial, for 
operant as well as respondent conditioning. Skinner distinguished between this 
and rule-governed behavior, maintaining that a complex learning history in one 
way or another bridges this dividing line. But what would such a history look 
like? That is a question he never answered. Early on, he mentioned the possibility 
of human language involving something more than the principles of operant and 
respondent conditioning (Skinner, 1938) but he later abandoned this alternative. 
The relation between covert and overt behaviors. As described previously, 
prediction and control are the two scientific goals of BA and in order to pursue 
the latter, behaviors have to be explained by taking into account contingencies 
that lie in the environment. In other words in BA a behavior-behavior relation is 
incomplete and needs to be further analysed. This assumption is valid while 
facing with either overt or covert behaviors. A relevant issue is that several topics 
within BA share with mentalistic accounts some of the same potential 
metatheoretical problems of encouraging incomplete accounts (Hayes & 
Brownstein, 1986). One of these, is the nature of the relation between covert and 
overt behaviors. Questions such as “What role does thinking play in the control 
of behavior?” are actually focusing on the nature of a behavior-behavior relation 
that has to be explained by appealing to particular contextual arrangements. 
Assuming a causative relation between thoughts and overt behaviors cannot be a 
complete explanation except to a mechanist, whose world view does not insist on 
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control as a necessary goal of science. As Skinner noted, after we have explained 
a response in terms of mental states or activities of feelings, we still need to 
explain the mental state. Of course, this raise a difficult challenge in BA - how to 
provide a comprehensive account of the relation that occurs between covert 
behaviors, such as thinking and overt behaviors such as language, without using 
tautological explanations? As Hayes and colleagues stated, “[t]he analysis of 
human language remains a mountain that behavioral psychology has yet to 
climb”. However, over the last few decades, behavior analysts started to provide 
convincing evidences about the processes that lie behind language and cognition, 
expanding Skinner theorisation into a new theory of language and cognition 
defined as Relational Frame Theory (RFT). It will be briefly described in the 
next paragraph (for a detailed description of RFT see the book Relational Frame 
Theory: A Post-Skinnerian Account of Human Language and Cognition, Hayes, 
Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001).  
RFT present a post-skinnerian account of human language and cognition that 
provides a useful framework to better understand the core characteristics of 
language. RFT embraced derived relations and indeed put them at the very heart 
of the account. Nevertheless, it remained a natural extension of earlier conceptual 
and empirical research within BA.  
The core concept in Hayes and colleagues’ book, i.e. arbitrarily applicable 
relational responding, was based solidly on Skinner’s concept of the operant and 
drew heavily on Sidman’s seminal work on equivalence classes. Specifically, 
equivalence class formation was seen as the result of a history of operant 
conditioning (a learned response class), and based on this argument, the 
possibility of multiple forms of such response classes (relational frames) was 
predicted.  
Thus RFT represents an additional opportunity to expand, in an experimental 
sense, the analysis of verbal functions expressed only theoretically by Skinner 
(1957) in the book Verbal Behavior and to address the above mentioned issues. 
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10.2.5. Relational Frame Theory  
In recent year, the work of Skinner has been widen further with the formulation 
of the Relational Frame Theory (RFT) (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001). 
In RFT the analysis of RGB is consistent with Skinner's position, namely, that 
rule-following can be conceptualised as any other kind of behavior. However the 
RFT further elaborate the analysis of the relations between behavior and 
environment involved in RGB, as well as analysing how such a repertoire can be 
acquired, without invoking hypothetical entities (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & 
Roche, 2001). 
In the early seventies, it was shown that humans with verbal competencies were 
able to find relations between stimuli even without learning them directly 
(Sidman & Tailby, 1982). For example, given three stimuli A, B and C, and their 
relation A > B and B > C, humans were able to derive relations between the 
stimuli that were not learned directly, such as C < B and B < A (mutual 
entailment) A > C and C < A (combinatorial entailment). 
Starting from these observations it has been hypothesised that the ability to 
derive relations between stimuli could be fundamental to explain the acquisition 
of human language and to understand how this can play a crucial role in BC. The 
ability to respond to stimuli based on derivative relations (derived relational 
responding) allows to assume that the stimulus function of an event can change 
without directly contacting contingencies (transformation of stimulus functions). 
Moreover, for humans with verbal competencies it is possible to derive relations 
based on Arbitrary Applicable Relational Responding (AARR). That means that 
humans could learn to respond relationally to objects where the relation is 
defined not by the physical properties of the objects, but by some other feature of 
the situation. A relational response of this kind is no longer dependent purely 
upon the physical properties of the stimuli (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 
2001). In this way, it is possible to structure networks of stimuli that can be 
linked in an arbitrary way and that are defined as “relational frames”. 
145
Behavioral Economics and Behavioral Change Policies
According to the RFT, verbal behavior occurs whenever stimuli are placed within 
a relational frame, generating the three phenomena of mutual entailment, 
combinatorial entailment and transformation of the stimulus function (Törneke, 
Barnes-Holmes & Hayes, 2010) mentioned above. 
Relational frames can be roughly organised into families (opposition, 
comparison, spatial, temporal, and so on) that specify the kind of relations 
between stimuli specific types of relations (Törneke, Barnes-Holmes & Hayes, 
2010). It is beyond the purpose of the PhD thesis to describe in detail each type 
of frame. Here it is sufficient to say that the human ability to put into verbal 
stimuli arbitrary relations make their behavior extremely flexible. This process, 
indeed, allow them to derive an exponential number of relations and 
consequently to change their behaviors independently by the direct consequences 
that they can produce. However the same processes can help to explain the 
development and maintenance of dysfunctional and harmful behaviors 
(Vilardaga, Hayes & Schelin, 2007). 
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11. Behavioral Economics and Behavioral Change Policies: A Behavioral 
Analytic Standpoint 
According to Angner and Loewenstein (2007), the historical roots of BE can be 
traced into cognitive psychology, a branch of psychology emerged in direct 
opposition to behaviorism. Following they compare this opposition with the one 
between NE and BE. 
Certainly, BE originates from the important and pioneering work of the 
cognitivist psychologists among which most important is the work of Daniel 
Kahneman.  
However, despite the historical debate between cognitivism and behaviorism, 
counterposing BE and Behaviorism tout court it is undoubtedly a mistake. Most 
criticisms, are indeed directed at the first Behaviorism of Watson. However, 
Behaviorism cannot be identified with Watson theorisation that represents just a 
part of it and has been widely revised by the most modern approaches in the 
study of behavior (see Moore, 2013). 
As it has be seen BA is a psychological theory rooted in the philosophy of 
science defined as functional contextualism. From the theoretical fundament of 
BA developed its basic science, the Experimental Analysis of Behavior (EAB) 
and from it the Applied Behavior Analysis (ABA) which is the development of 
procedures and technologies aiming to improve people's behavior and in broader 
sense society. As represented in Figure 26 BE and Nudge can be seen as an 
application of BA in the society.  9
 BE can be considered as at the border between basic science and its applications. In the next 9
sections will be considered in the first meaning.
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Figure 26. The figure (adapted from Anchisi, Moderato & Pergolizzi, p. 101) represents an 
epistemological frame of BA that includes BE and  Nudge. 
11.1. “Cognitive” Behavioral Economics and “Behavioral” Behavioral 
Economics 
While addressing the theme of irrationality, a continuum could be traced in order 
to explain irrational behaviors (Reed, Niileksela and Kaplan, 2013). On one side 
lies the assumption of several researchers and cognitive psychologists that 
irrational behaviors may be explained in terms of mentalistic psychological 
causes, such as psychological predispositions or cognitive bias (e.g. Angner & 
Loewenstein, 2007; Camerer, 1999; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). On 
the other side, the behavioral analytic perspective moves the focus on behavioral 
principles as a useful tool to define irrational behaviors (e.g. Hursh, 1980; 
Skinner, 1953). In line with this point of view, the relation between context and 
behavior becomes fundamental.  
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Irrational behaviors may be seen as the result of the reinforcing action of the 
context in establishing particular negative consequences (e.g. overeating, 
smoking or doing too little physical activity, etc.). That would happen because 
the immediate consequences of certain behaviors may have a more reinforcing 
value compared to those that would lead to better outcomes in the long run (e.g. 
being in a good physical shape, being healthy while ageing, etc. ) (Reed, 
Niileksela & Kaplan, 2013). This kind of dysfunctional relation between 
behavior and consequences has been described by Bickel and colleagues as the 
“reinforcer pathology” (Bickel, Jarmolowicz, Mueller, & Gatchalian, 2011). 
According to Reed, Niileksela and Kaplan (2013) one of the main advantages in 
adopting a behavioral analytic perspective in the study of human irrationality 
may be the more parsimonious perspective of BA. The same processes defined in 
BE could be probably described without using mentalistic constructs that are 
difficult to evaluate on an empirical level. As described in depth in the previous 
sections, the function of BA is finding those contextual variables (that can be 
verbal or physical) that can be manipulated in order to have the chance not just to 
predict behaviors but also to control them. Doing so, could help to focus better 
on the elements upon which it is possible to act in order to promote a positive 
BC. The recent research supports this position, providing preliminary evidence 
that the behavioral analytic perspective compared to the explanations of more 
mentalistic approaches, could provide more parsimonious explanations of some 
economic principles that describe irrational behaviors, (e.g., Kohlenberg, Hayes, 
& Hayes, 1991; Reed, Reed, Chok, & Brozyna, 2011). The behavioral analytic 
approach does not reject the fundamental assumptions of BE, nor it has to be 
seen as opposing it on the practical level. Following Kahneman’s view, 
individuals, in certain circumstances, act in a way that is far from rational.  
The methodology used to understand certain behaviors, however, is different. 
The subject of debate could be the description vs explanation of such behaviors. 
On one hand, the cognitive behavioral economists understand which are the 
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internal states that drive certain irrational behaviors, on the other hand, a 
behavioral analyst would look at the contextual contingencies that increase the 
likelihood of certain behavioral responses. An explanatory system that takes into 
account inner tendency or mental constructs could be unnecessary and of little 
use. By simply describing behaviors and observing their function even the use of 
labels like “rational” or “irrational” could be easily replaced by the terms 
“functional” or “dysfunctional”. Indeed the first two terms are necessarily tied to 
models or theories that state what people should do in order to be considered 
rational. Conversely, the terms functional and dysfunctional, describe the relation 
between certain behaviors and their outcome, that can be seen as more or less 
useful to achieve goals predetermined by the individuals or the collective. A 
behavioral analytic approach would observe what actually people do and which 
are the contextual variables that control their behavior. People may be for 
example under the control of direct contingencies or their behavior may be 
controlled by verbal rules. By carefully assessing these variables, researchers and 
policy makers would have all the necessary tools to predict certain behavioral 
responses and control them, promoting in this way a BC. Interestingly, that’s 
exactly what both the proponents of the H&B and the SH aim and do in practice, 
beyond their sharp debate.  
11.2. Behavioral Change: A Behavioral Analytic Standpoint 
In the next sections the main policy program developed from the theoretical 
framework of BE, i.e. Nudge, is analysed from a behavioral analytic perspective. 
On this extent, it may be useful to get back to the original definition of nudge 
provided by Thaler & Sunstein:  
“A nudge [...] is any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a 
predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic 
incentives.”  
(Thaler & Sunstein 2008, p. 6) 
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Having in mind this definition it is possible to take into account its core features 
and to underline the existing commonalities and divergences between Nudge and 
BA. 
11.2.1. Commonalities and Differences between Nudge and Behavioral 
Analysis 
Work on the context. The need to work on the context in order to promote 
desirable behaviors is not something new in the field of BS and the study of 
human behaviors and their interaction with the context.Moreover, it was at the 
very core of BA much earlier than Thaler and Sunstein’s formulation.  
The techniques used in Nudge interventions should by definition be focused on 
the manipulation of antecedents, while the consequences of behavior should not 
be (directly) manipulated (see Figure 27).  
 
Figure 27. The figure shows how Nudge can be seen as a part of BA and where it could fit in 
the four-term contingency model. 
Working on antecedents is another core feature of BA and may work quite well in 
different situations. Let’s think for example of situations in which a certain 
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behavior have to be emitted just one time a year (e.g. subscribe to college or 
renew a magazine subscription) or of environments in which the crowd of people 
is so diverse and numerous that it would be impossible, or completely 
unsustainable working directly on the consequences (e.g. reducing littering in the 
centre of a big city). On this extent, Thaler and Sunstein have to be credited for 
developing a very sustainable approach.  
Working both on antecedents and consequences (monetary or non-monetary) 
broadens the range of possible actions that a policy maker can use to pursue 
positive BC. It also makes more successful interventions, for example, for the 
promotion of long term changes to a specific target of people (e.g. keep regular 
healthy eating habits).  
Taking into account the definition of Thaler and Sunstein, and considering Nudge 
as a work on certain kind of contingency, i.e. antecedents, it may be therefore 
defined as a way to manipulate physically or verbally the (verbal or physical) 
antecedents (MO and/or SD) of a behavior to help people contact possible natural 
consequences of their behavior (that may be positive or negative) in order to 
predictably increase/decrease the chance that certain behavioral responses would 
occur, without directly manipulating their consequences.  
To this extent, Nudge could be considered as an approach that develop its 
interventions by taking into account just part of the features of BA, i.e. the work 
on the antecedents. The three experiments of the “Nudge and wellbeing” project 
described in Part 3 have been developed in this way. In some cases the work was 
purely on physical antecedents (e.g. Experiment 5, in which the content of the 
sugar packets was changed) in other cases the verbal antecedents were 
manipulated too (e.g. Experiment 3 in which instructions and information were 
provided together with the manipulation of the default rule; Experiment 4 in 
which the label with the slogan was used together with the basket where people 
were supposed to place their smartphones). 
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Prediction and Control. As described earlier in this part of the PhD thesis (Part 
4, section 10.2.) prediction and control of the behavior are the two goals of BA 
and any intervention must include these two features. In order to pursue these 
goals, behavioral analysts observe the behavior to understand which are the 
contextual stimuli (physical or verbal) that control it and how they can be 
manipulated in order to promote a positive BC. The definition provided by 
Thaler and Sunstein perfectly matches with the point of view of BA on this 
aspect. All the interventions carried out in the project “Nudge and well being” 
were designed to follow these two principles and to work just on variables that 
were directly manipulable allowing to predict certain behaviors and to control 
them. 
Freedom of Choice. The notion of libertarian paternalism is central in Thaler and 
Sunstein’s work and matches two main features: freedom and control. Nudge 
aims to leave people free to choose and in the meanwhile to push them in a kind 
way toward better choices. The last part is usually the source of its biggest 
critique and why people have doubts about Nudging. The question here may be 
what freedom means and most importantly how much people are in general free 
to choose?  
Skinner in his studies challenges the notion of freedom and control and his 
thoughts look quite timely and fit incredibly well with the recent developments in 
the study of human behavior described in the PhD thesis. In the early ‘70s 
Skinner stressed in his book “Beyond Freedom and Dignity” (Skinner, 1971) on 
the need to act on contextual factors in order to change behavior. He emphasising 
on how some form of external control is unavoidable so that freedom is simply 
not achievable, nor possible. We can gain a certain amount of freedom but it is 
impossible to avoid the influence of certain contingencies on our behavior, due to 
the history of our interaction with the environment: 
“A person wants something if he acts to get it when the occasion arises. A person who 
says “I want something to eat” will presumably eat when something becomes available. 
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If he says “I want to get warm,” he will presumably move into a warm place when he 
can. These acts have been reinforced in the past by whatever was wanted. What a 
person feels when he feels himself wanting something depends upon the circumstances. 
[…] Certain contingencies have raised the probability of behavior and at the same time 
have created conditions which may be felt. Freedom is a matter of contingencies of 
reinforcement, not of the feelings the contingencies generate.”  
(Skinner 1971, pp.41-42) 
Manipulation of contingencies is seen in this view as neither negative, nor 
positive. What Skinner suggests is to work to redesign the environment in order 
to make it as much free as possible of a specific kind of stimuli, the aversive 
ones. That fits perfectly well with the basic principles of Nudge. 
11.2.2. Improving Nudge Interventions through Behavioral Analysis 
A strong positive quality of the Nudge theory is that behavior and choice are 
examined with the idea that there is always a reason behind them. In addition, the 
dysfunctional behaviors are predictable to a great extent and thus can be expected 
and prevented. 
One of the strengths of Nudge is that human behavior, and choices in particular, 
are seen like something that happen for a reason. Moreover, irrational behaviors 
are seen as largely predictable and prevented.  
Parsimony. The work of Thaler and Sunstein is very empirical. However, they 
often use mentalistic terms that don’t add any power in terms of control and 
prediction. Terms like System 1 and System 2, or Homo oeconomicus and homo 
sapiens can have an heuristic function and it can be extremely useful to make 
some concepts easy to understand and more appealing to the readers. The risk is 
to get  stuck to these labels and to use them as explanatory of people's behaviors. 
Using a more analytical description in the scientific realm may be more useful to 
increase knowledge about people's behaviors. On this extent, BA may be a 
parsimonious approach in the study of human behavior, allowing to better 
operationalise certain concepts and processes. As described previously, 
manipulating antecedents and consequences allows the researchers to work on a 
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wide range of issues addressed in the literature of Nudge without invoking 
mentalistic terms. Once we know which are the dysfunctional behaviors and the 
ones that we want to promote, we can work on the other two contingencies 
(antecedents and consequences) in order to promote BC.  
Better Operationalisation. In many cases, Thaler and Sunstein underline that 
certain contexts can facilitate certain behaviors. That’s in line with BA. However, 
further clarification may be necessary in order to set interventions that really have 
in mind the behavior in its context. One of the risks in the lack of 
operationalisation is that, antecedent stimuli may be taken as causative of people’s 
choices. BA as previously described, has a different vision. It assumes that the 
consequences of behaviors shape the behaviors themselves.  
Let’s make that clear with an example. A person may feel the urge to use a toilet 
(MO, more precisely EO), looking around and finding a door with the label 
“toilet” (SD). He may open the door (B) and relieve his urge (C). The experienced 
C would probably reinforce B. So when in the future the person feels a similar 
urge and sees a door with the label “toilet” it will be more probable that he will 
produce the same B. However, the increased probability of B is not caused by SD. 
The SD facilitated B, but just in the sense that allowed the person to contact the 
reinforcing C (relieving the urge) previously experienced by emitting the same B 
while the EO increases its strength.  
Bringing this perspective into Nudge or other BC policies programs, it should be 
clear that working on the antecedents of behaviors does not mean that behaviors 
are caused by antecedents, but just that the consequences that actually shape the 
behaviors are not deliberately and directly manipulated. Interventions just allow 
that the consequences of certain behaviors can be naturally experienced and 
hopefully, that they can produce long lasting changes.  
Less Arbitrariness. In Thaler and Sunstein’s definition of Nudge, the authors 
underline that interventions should not “significantly” alter economic incentives. 
In their book the authors further specify that they believe economic incentives 
(also non monetary ones) must not be high. This may create some confusion 
because it is not clear what “significantly” means and which is the initial 
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parameter from which to decide whether economic incentives changed 
“significantly”. Thus leaving wide open space to arbitrariness especially when 
non monetary incentives are used. Let’s take for example an intervention carried 
out by Banerjee and colleagues (Banerjee et al., 2010) in several rural villages in 
Rajasthan (India). To increase the immunisation rate in the villages, the families 
of the children were provided with 1kg of raw lentils after each administration of 
the immunisation and a set of metal plates once the full procedure of 
immunisation was completed. Is that a significant incentive or the intervention 
can be considered as a nudge? In that sense Thaler and Sunstein’s definition must 
be further clarified. 
More Consistency between Theory and Application. As stated above, many 
techniques used in Nudge interventions manipulate directly antecedents without 
working on the consequences of the behavior. However, at least some of the 
interventions developed so far and counted as nudges have also directly 
manipulated the consequences of behavior. For example, providing a smile when 
citizens consume little energy, directly works on the consequences of behavior 
(e.g. Costa & Kahn, 2013; Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein & Griskevicius, 
2007). These kind of interventions are assumed to directly reinforce a desirable 
behavior, so they could be considered inconsistent with the definition of Nudge. 
However, it is reasonable to think that Thaler, Sunstein and the other experts in 
the field would consider these interventions as nudges, considering their non 
punishing method, their sustainability and potential effects. That’s also much in 
line with Skinner’s thought and preference for positive reinforcement instead of 
using punishment and aversive control. To sum up, it may be useful to provide a 
clearer definition of what is or is not a nudge. Moreover, a good solution could be 
adding direct manipulation of consequences using only those that are assumed to 
reinforce positively the functional behaviors. 
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Conclusion 
The PhD thesis had several goals. First of all, the paper aimed to provide an 
extensive historical and theoretical framework of the most flourishing approaches 
in the study of decision making and its applications in society. Part 1 described 
what has been known until now in the realm of decision making focusing on BE 
and its different streams of thought. Part 2 provided a wider view of the 
applications of the notions evident in BE in the realm of public policies, 
describing the best know policy programs and their main features. 
In the few last years economy and psychology play a crucial role in the 
development of effective tools and strategies to tackle important social issues and 
to promote well-being. The hope is that the attention gathered by the new 
emergent approaches in BC will keep growing and so their influence on public 
policies. The first two parts aimed also to provide a theoretical base for the 
understanding of the research work carried out during the PhD and described in 
part 3. 
The second goal of the thesis was to provide evidence for the effectiveness of the 
approaches, described in the first two parts, in the Italian context. Several 
experiments were carried out, mostly in Italy, showing their efficacy and 
sustainability. Although some attempts to promote BA and Nudge in Italy have 
been done their dissemination on the territory is far from being wide spread, 
unlike in other countries. A more proficient dialogue between policy makers and 
experts in BS could greatly contribute to improve individual and social welfare 
through those approaches. 
Finally, Part 4 aimed to broaden the dialogue around human decisions providing 
a behavioral analytic perspective of the principles of BE and its applications, 
highlighting their commonalities and divergences with BA on a theoretical and 
practical level. The main strengths of BE and its applications are their versatility 
and sustainability, that allowed to apply the ongoing knowledge in a wide range 
of domains and their their quick spread in the last few years. BA on the other side 
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is a discipline with solid methodological roots, although it has been often 
confined in the clinical and laboratory settings.  
Skinner in his utopian novel “Walden Two” brilliantly synthesised what should 
be the aim of BS: 
“The choice is clear: either we do nothing and allow a miserable and probably catastrophic 
future to overtake us, or we use our knowledge about human behaviour to create a social 
environment in which we shall live productive and creative lives and do so without jeopardising 
the chances that those who follow us will be able to do the same.” 
(Skinner 1948, XVI) 
A multidisciplinary dialogue between the different disciplines that have as their 
main goal the promotion of well-being could certainly enrich the knowledge 
about the domain of human decisions and could help to build more effective and 
long lasting interventions, ultimately improving the quality of life of the 
individuals and the society.  
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Appendix A 
Materials for the experiment:  
“Decoy effect and customer preferences for newspaper subscriptions: A 
Randomized Controlled Trial” 
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Original Versions of the experiment 
Version A: cover paper + task 
 
 
Version B: cover paper + task 
 
 
178
Behavioral Economics and Behavioral Change Policies
Appendix B 
Materials for the experiment:  
“Relative and Absolute framing: a Randomized Controlled Trial to evaluate the 
risk perception about incidence of colorectal cancer by consuming processed 
meat” 
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Original Versions of the experiment 
Version A: Cover paper + task 
 
 
Version B: Cover paper + task 
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Appendix C 
Materials for the experiment:  
“No waste by default: Nudging to prevent food waste in restaurants” 
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C1. Centrepiece used in the Italian and Swiss Trial.  
Printed on carton paper, A4 format, and four folded 
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C2. Centrepiece used in the Greek Trial.  
Printed on carton paper, A4 format, and four folded 
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C3. Menu Flyer  10
 
 The same Menu flyer showed in the Appendix is the one used in the Italian trial. The same 10
flyer was used In the Swiss trial substituting Italian data about food waste with the Swiss ones 
(i.e. 300kg)
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C4. Guidelines for waiters  11
 
 The same guideline were used in the Swiss and Greek trial (in the Greek trial the language 11
was adapted. 
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C5. Observational grid  12
  
 The same observational grid was used in the Italian, Swiss and Greek trial (in the Greek trial 12
the language was adapted).
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Appendix D 
Materials for the experiment:  
“Digital detox: preliminary findings of a Nudge intervention to reduce the usage 
of digital devices in social contexts” 
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D1: Basket and label 
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D2. Observational grid 
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Appendix E 
Materials for the experiment:  
“Less sugar by default: resize the packets of sugar to reduce its consumption in a 
coffee shop” 
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Observational grid 
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